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THE EFFECT OF ANXIETY ON DIRECTION
OF ATTENTION AND SHORT-TERM MEMORY
by
Charles Barry Kreitzberg
Advisor: Dr. Sigmund Tobias
The purpose of this research was to examine the effect of anxiety on
rehearsal in short-term memory. It was hypothesized that anxiety
arousal would result in attentional alternation between task-relevant
rehearsal and task-irrelevant personalized thinking. Because atten­
tional focus becomes increasingly unitary at high levels of arousal,
it was anticipated that the alternation resulting from anxiety would
interfere with rehearsal of task-relevant information in short-term
memory.
One hundred-fifty subjects were randomly assigned to a high-stress
(testlike) or low-stress (neutral) condition. They were shown to-be- 
recalled strings consisting of seven consonants of low associability. 
Following a 1.5 second exposure to a given string, subjects were shown
a series of addition problems which functioned as an interpolated task
to control rehearsal. On two trials, the to-be-recalled string formed
a meaningful seven-letter word. Anxiety arousal during the experiment
was measured by the State Worrv/Emotionality scale. Trait anxiety was
measured by the Test Anxiety Scale one week prior to the experiment.
The expected relationship between anxiety arousal and recall was found
for the low-stress condition but was not significant for the high-stress
condition. Individuals who reported high worry/emotionality arousal
recalled fewer letters than those who reported low arousal. Subjects
in the high-stress condition recalled fewer letters than those in the
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low-stress condition. Trait anxiety did not predict letter recall
but did predict performance on the interpolated task.
The results are seen as generally supportive of the attentional
alternation hypothesis and are discussed in terms of their theoret­
ical and practical relevance.
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INTRODUCTION
Ours is an age of anxiety -- characterized by a psychological 
construct whose manifestations are apparent in our art, our music, 
our literature, and our habits. Americans spend over ten billion 
dollars each year on alcoholic beverages: hundreds of tons of 
tranquilizing medications are dispensed each year (Coleman, 1964). 
Schlesinger (1948) has called anxiety the "official emotion of our 
age."
Of course, anxiety is not unique to our age; the contemporary
preoccupation with anxiety is a result of our recognition of its
centrality in the dynamics of interpersonal interactions and its
role in psychopathology. According to Levitt:
Anxiety is timeless; but only in recent years...have we 
begun to realize its enormous impact on human life. The 
list of phenomena in which it has been claimed that anxiety 
plays a role is imposing.
...Almost every corner of human endeavor is thought to be 
affected somehow by anxiety...Anxiety is not only our 
official emotion; it is the primary focus of a concerted 
effort aimed at the improvement, and perhaps the perpet­
uation, of human life (1967, p.2).
Because it affects so much behavior, anxiety is an important 
construct in theories of personality. Since Freud (1923) recognized 
anxiety's central role in personality development, anxiety has been 
incorporated into most other theories of personality. Seymour Sarason 
and his colleagues in their book, Anxiety in Elementary School Children 
state that they "are not aware of any systematic conception of personality, 
particularly with regard to its development, which does not give the 
concept of anxiety a role of great, if not of central, significance"
(S. Sarason, Davidson, Lighthall, Waite, and Ruebush, 1960, p. 5).
Faced with the immense theoretical and practical importance of the 
anxiety construct, psychologists have responded with a voluminous body
1
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of literature on anxiety. Spielberger (1966b) noted that between 
1928-1931, anxiety constituted about 0.2% of the entries in Psycho­
logical Abstracts but by 1960-1963 the percentage of literature 
categorized as anxiety-related had grown to 1.6%— an eightfold 
increase.
One specific type of anxiety which has received considerable 
study is test anxiety. Test anxiety is a construct whose manifest­
ations are familiar to many students. Faced with the prospect of an 
examination, test-anxious persons become emotionally upset and self- 
deprecatory (Wine, 1973). As a result, evaluative experiences are 
extremely unpleasant for the highly test-anxious person who may go to 
extreme lengths to avoid anxiety-provoking situations. To some extent 
this fear of examinations is justified because under stress, test 
anxious people do not perform as well as their less anxious peers, 
although it has repeatedly been shown that anxious people are as 
intelligent as those less anxious (S. Sarason, Mandler & Craighill,
1952; Spielberger, 1966a). Highly test-anxious people are trapped in 
a vicious circle. Because of anxiety, they tend to perform sub-optimally 
in an evaluative situation. Their disappointing performance merely 
confirms their fears and reinforces the anxiety-provoking aspects 
of the test situation. Thus, test anxiety may be quite debilitat­
ing. Because of its ubiquity, test anxiety is an important concern in 
our achievement-oriented society.
The Practical Importance of Test Anxiety
The significance of test anxiety as a debilitating force in academic 
achievement-oriented situations has been reviewed by Spielberger (1966a). 
In a study at Duke University, Spielberger found that more than 20% of a 
group of high-anxious students dropped out of school because of academic 
failure while only 6% of a low-anxious group, drawn from the same 
population, dropped out of school for this reason. The detrimental 
effects of anxiety on academic performance were more pronounced among the
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lowest ability students where the failure rate of high-anxious 
students, as compared to low-anxious students, was nearly two to one.
The relationship between anxiety and grade point average was found to 
parallel the relationship between anxiety and academic failure 
(Spielberger, 1962; Spielberger and Katzenmeyer, 1959). High-anxious 
students had lower grade point averages than low-anxious students 
except for students of very low aptitude (where a "floor" effect on 
grade point average was presumed to be operating) and for students of 
very high aptitude (where a "ceiling" effect on task difficulty was 
presumed).
Among elementary school children, Lunneborg (1964) found that 
high anxiety was associated with poor achievement in reading and 
mathematics. Gaudry and Spielberger (1971) reviewed a number of 
studies relating anxiety to academic achievement and concluded that 
the most consistent findings were that high anxiety was associated 
with low academic achievement at all levels of academic experience.
Because high anxiety has consistently been related to poor 
academic performance, anxiety is a construct of considerable educational 
importance and considerable effort has been devoted to investigating 
its characteristics.
Test Anxiety as a Theoretical Construct
Not only is test anxiety a construct of practical educational importance, 
but it is theoretically important as well. One of the major problems 
faced by investigators studying anxiety is the highly idiosyncratic 
nature of anxiety reactions. The stimuli which elicit anxiety vary 
considerably among individuals. Consequently, exposing a random 
group of individuals to a presumed stressful situation does not assure 
the effectiveness of the anxiety-induction procedure. This problem is 
minimized if the anxiety-proneness of individual subjects in the 
experimental situation can be assessed. For example, only some 
individuals asked to perform an experimental task in the presence of 
a (presumably anxiety-arousing) snake would experience anxiety.
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Because of the control gained by considering anxiety with respect 
to a specific stimulus situation, a number of investigators have chosen 
to focus their research on test anxiety. Test anxiety has proven to be
a useful focus for anxiety research because it is easily aroused, it is
a ubiquitous phenomenon in our achievement-oriented culture, and it is 
of practical, as well as theoretical, significance. According to
S. Sarason et. al., there are two major reasons for a research study to
focus on test anxiety. "First, the test situation frequently evokes 
the anxious response at a strength which should allow..[one]... to 
evaluate...[one's]... theoretical conceptions about the significance 
of anxiety in the organization and development of personality. Second, 
if test anxiety is an important and frequent response to the test 
situation, then the development of a valid methodology for its assess­
ment would have relevance for the general problem of the nature and 
effects of test-taking attitudes and reactions" (1960, p. 10).
To the extent that the pattern of test-anxiety arousal is typical 
of anxiety-arousal in other situations, research findings based on test­
like situations may be generalized to other anxiety-arousing situations. 
Although patterns of anxiety-arousal may vary across different situations 
and certainly varies across individuals in the same situation, test 
anxiety appears to have much in common with other forms of anxiety. A 
number of theorists (Fenichel, 1945; Wine, 1973) have noted that test 
anxiety is closely related to, or identical with, the more general 
construct known as evaluation anxiety which includes such phenomena as 
stage fright, fear of speeches, fear of blushing, and certain social 
fears. Wine (1973) suggested that the central element in evaluation 
anxiety is the possession, on the part of the anxious individual, of 
negative self-cognitions which are activated by conditions of evaluative 
psychological stress. The class of anxiety reactions which Wine 
categorized as evaluation anxiety are those situations in which the 
major threat is to the individual's self-esteem. Most anxiety 
reactions resulting from interpersonal interactions involve such a 
threat and may be expected to evoke patterns of response similar to those 
resulting from test-induced anxiety.
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The Goals of the Current Study
Like most psychological constructs, anxiety is not a simple 
phenomenon. Anxiety reactions are not unitary but are patterns of 
response which are elicited by a wide variety of individually- 
relevant stimuli. The characteristics of a particular anxiety 
reaction depend upon the interaction between the individual and the 
stimulus situation.
Recently, a number of theorists (I. Sarason, 1972; Wine, 1973) 
have suggested that the debilitating effect of anxiety on performance 
may result from ways in which anxious individuals deploy their focal 
attention. This notion stems from the fact that since anxiety states 
are unpleasant, they may be attentionally demanding. Anxious individuals 
are hypothesized to alternate their attention between their anxiety 
reaction and task-relevant variables. Wine (1973) reviewed a large 
number of studies and concluded that previous research was consistent 
with the hypothesis that attentional focus was affected by anxiety.
I. Sarason (1972) also found the attentional formulation to be consistent 
with previous anxiety research.
The cognitive-attentional formulations of Wine (1973) and I. Sarason 
(1972) suggest that anxiety reactions may interfere with rehearsal in 
short-term memory. Norman (1969a) has noted that rehearsal may be 
considered equivalent to attention. Attention withdrawn from short­
term memory would reduce rehearsal and lead to decay of memory contents. 
This decay would have an adverse effect of task performance.
The current study investigated the relationship between test- 
anxiety and the short-term retention of letter-strings. It was hypothe­
sized that anxiety would degrade performance on a task which was highly 
dependent upon short-term memory.
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Chapter I reviews a number of important formulations of anxiety.
The attentional alternation hypothesis is shown to be consistent with 
these formulations.
Chapter II reviews findings which suggest the hypothesis that 
anxiety would interfere with short-term memory rehearsal.
Chapter III describes the design of an experiment designed to 
investigate the hypothesis proposed in Chapter II.
Chapter IV presents the results of the experiment.
Chapter V discusses the findings of the experiment. The cognitive- 
attentional formulation is extended in the context of the theories 
discussed in Chapter I. Finally, areas for future research are suggested.
CHAPTER I
ANXIETY AS A THEORETICAL CONSTRUCT
Despite its ubiquity and introspective availability, anxiety is 
not a well-defined construct. Most definitions of anxiety lack 
operational precision. According to Cattell, for the past 50 years 
anxiety has wallowed in a "morass of complete terminological and 
conceptual confusion...[in which] there has certainly been no lack 
of definitions... at the verbal, non-operational level, beginning 
with Freud's distinction of Angst and Furcht. This literature, how­
ever, at its rare best, produces definitions as unstable as our 
turbulent language, and susceptible later to all the whims of exegesis" 
(1966, p. 24) .
Although operational definitions have the advantages of rigor, 
they may fail to acknowledge subtleties of the construct being 
measured. For example, the common practice of defining anxiety 
operationally as the score received by a subject on a questionnaire 
such as the Manifest Anxiety Scale fails to adequately reflect the 
multidimensional nature of anxiety (Jessor and Hammond, 1957).
Thus, the theorist attempting to define anxiety is hard-pressed 
to choose between operational rigor and non-operational richness.
In evaluating previous formulations, it is necessary to realize that 
the problem of defining anxiety is complicated by the need to 
explicate the relationships among the closely related constructs of 
anxiety, fear, phobia, and stress. The distinctions among these 
constructs are not clear-cut since all of them refer to psychological 
states with unpleasant affective overtones.
Izard and Tomkins have argued that "there are no theoretic­
ally useful distinctions between [anxiety and fear]" (1966, p. 99).
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Mowrer (1939) has also suggested that anxiety and fear are equivalent, 
and that anxiety is the conditioned form of the fear reaction. Some 
theorists have distinguished between anxiety and fear by defining 
fear as a reaction to a perceived threat and defining anxiety as a 
special type of fear which is not directed at an external object. 
According to this view, anxiety may be regarded as the affective 
manifestation of cognitive perception. This view suggests that anxiety- 
evoking cues are largely internal but may be elicited by an external 
stimulus (phobic object).
Like fear, phobias are directed at an external object but the 
response is disproportionate to the actual threat. Freud (1923) 
regarded phobias as a form of neurotic anxiety which derived their 
intensity from free-floating anxietv. Salzman (1973) suggested that 
in "true" phobias the phobic object was symbolically (conceptually) 
linked to a conditioned fear-provoking stimulus while conditioned 
fear reactions (which closely resemble phobias behaviorally) result 
from simple stimulus generalizations. As with the distinction 
between anxiety and fear, the distinction between fear and phobia is 
not always clear. At what point should a fear of dogs, for example, 
be regarded as phobic? While there are instances in which a reaction 
may unambiguously be classified as fear, anxiety, or phobia, most 
cases are ambiguous.
Stress is often used as a synonym for anxiety. Levitt (1967) 
suggests that this usage is popular for stylistic rather than 
theoretical reasons. In the current study, stress is used as an 
adjective which describes a stimulus situation; stress situation, is 
a situation which contains cues intended to arouse anxiety; stressed 
individual is one who encounters a stress situation; and stress 
reaction is the result of such an encounter in terms of the individual's 
response to stress. This usage follows Levitt's (1967) suggestions.
The inability of theorists to agree upon precise definitions of 
anxiety, fear, stress, and phobia stems from the fact that these 
labels are not associated with specific responses. Rather, they
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classify patterns of response which vary across individuals and time. 
For example, two individuals who generally experience anxiety reactions 
to dogs may manifest entirely different reactions upon encountering a 
particular dog— one person might flee; the other might call for help. 
Similarly, a single individual's reaction to a given dog may vary over 
occasions— both in terms of the intensity of the perceived affect and 
the specific responses elicited.
Accordingly, the construct of anxiety must be understood as 
describing a class of complex and variable response patterns. To date, 
no somatic or behavioral response unique to anxiety has been found 
and it is unlikely that one exists. There is no single "correct" 
definition of anxiety, because all anxiety is not the same. And as 
Schachter (1964) has shown, the label assigned to a particular response 
pattern depends upon the individual's perception of somatic cues. 
Individuals may be inconsistent in the labels that they assign to 
their own patterns of response, depending upon their context.
Review of Major Theories
This chapter reviews a number of major theories of anxiety which 
are the direct predecessors of the formulation investigated in the 
current study. Each theory has focused upon selected aspects of the 
complex phenomenon of anxiety; each is therefore incomplete.
Although none of the theories of anxiety to be discussed is 
sufficiently broad to account for all anxiety-related phenomena, with­
in its domain, each is supported by a body of empirical research.
Aspects of each have contributed to the view of anxiety which under­
lies the current study.
The theories to be reviewed include Freud's (1923) psychoanalytic 
formulation; Dollard and Miller's (1950) learning-theoretic formulation, 
K.W. Spence's (1958) drive theory; Spielberger's (1972) trait-state 
theory; Mandler and Sarason's (1952) theory of test anxiety and Wine's 
(1971) restatement of that theory in attentional terms; and Liebert 
and Morris' (1967) worry/emotionality factors.
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Because each theory has focused on selected aspects of anxiety 
responses, most have been associated with a technique or scale for 
anxiety measurement. Since these measures reflect the orientation 
of the particular theory, all have proven inadequate as complete 
descriptions of anxiety; however, each has proven useful within the 
particular theory. The measurement methodology associated with each 
of the theories is discussed in conjunction with the theory.
Freud’s Theory of Anxiety
It is appropriate to begin a survey of theories of anxiety with 
a consideration of Freud's contribution because, more than any other 
psychologist of his time, Freud recognized the centrality of anxiety 
in psychopathology. Strangely, this recognition was slow in coming. 
Originally, Freud conceived of anxiety as the result of repression.
In his early theorizing, Freud saw anxiety as an affective discharge 
which resulted from the inability of a sexual impulse to be expressed 
(repressed libido).
In 1926, however, Freud published The Problem of Anxiety"*" in 
which he assigned anxiety a far more central role than he had in 
his earlier theory. In this work, Freud distinguished between three 
types of anxiety: reality (objective) anxiety, neurotic anxiety,
and moral anxiety. Freud equated reality anxiety (or objective anxiety) 
to fear— a reaction to a perceived external threat. In objective 
anxiety, the amount of anxiety aroused would be a direct function of 
the magnitude of the perceived threat. Objective anxiety has been 
schematized by Spielberger (1966b, p. 10) as follows:
external danger ---> perception of danger ---> objective anxietv
Because of the unpleasant affect associated with anxiety, people 
experiencing objective anxiety will strive to avoid the threat by 




Neurotic anxiety results from impulses which, carried out in 
the past, led to punishment. In the sense that the impulses are, in 
fact, dangerous since they lead to punishment, neurotic anxiety is 
similar to objective anxiety. The dangers perceived are the consequences 
of impulsive (id-directed) action. Neurotic anxiety differs from object­
ive anxiety in that the cues which serve as the danger signal to trigger 
it (the id impulses) are not apparent to the individual. Since the 
perception of the unacceptable impulse raises feelings of apprehension 
of punishment, the person attempts to alleviate the objective anxiety 
by repressing the cues which evoke it; but, the impulses are demanding 
and cannot always be repressed. Whenever the repression mechanism fails, 
partial cues of the impulse impinge upon awareness and arouse neurotic 
anxiety. Since the impulse which is the source of the anxiety is large­
ly repressed, the sufferer is unaware of its cause. Hence, neurotic 
anxiety is experienced as objectless or free floating. Spielberger 
(1966b, p. 10) has d iagrammed the sequence of events:
internal __> external danger __> objective  repression
impulses (punishment) anxiety
partial breakdown  > derivatives of  neurotic
of repression internal impulses anxiety
Thus, the source of neurotic anxiety is internal rather than 
external. Both the partially repressed impulse and the source of 
threatened punishment (superego) have become part of the personality 
of the person experiencing anxiety.
Moral anxiety results from the perception by the superego that an 
action or thought is incongruous with the standards of appropriate 
behavior incorporated into that aspect of self-concept which Freud 
termed the ego-ideal. Moral anxiety is usually experienced as shame 
or guilt. As with neurotic anxiety, the source of moral anxiety is 
internal although the cue which elicits it may be external.
Freud's description of anxiety has served as the starting point 
for most subsequent formulations. Although Freud's ideas have had a 
profound effect on the clinical treatment of anxiety, they have proven 
less useful for purposes of research.
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The assessment techniques most often associated with Freudian 
theory are projective instruments such as the Rorschach ink blots and 
the Thematic Apperception Test. The rationale for the use of project­
ive measures was based on the assumption that such methods were capable 
of disclosing aspects of the individual's private world of meanings, 
significances, patterns and feelings (Frank, 1939). While projectives 
are well-suited to the clinical environment in which the individual's 
patterns of response are of primary interest, research results have 
been disappointing. For example, movement, a common Rorschach 
indicator of anxiety, was inversely related to anxiety in four out 
of eight studies; only three of the relationships were statistically 
significant.
Because the relationship between projective indicators and 
questionnaire methods of anxiety measurement tend to be low to 
moderate, projective instruments are generally employed for certain 
types of individual clinical assessment (Iacino and Cook, 1974).
Learning Theory
American behaviorism was less than sympathetic to Freud's 
"mentalistic terminology" (Mowrer, 1939) and sought alternative form­
ulations which relied on observable behavior rather than metaphor.
Early work by Pavlov, Watson, and Thorndike and, particularly Hull's 
(1943) hypothetico-deductive system have provided a foundation for 
the development of theories of anxiety.
The basis of these theories is that "anxiety (fear) is the 
conditioned form of the pain reaction" (Mowrer, 1939, p. 555). Thus, 
if a pain-producing stimulus is paired with neutral stimuli, the 
neutral stimuli will come to elicit a fear or anxiety reaction. The 
most integrative of the learning theories was Bollard and Miller's 
(1950) learning theoretic reformulation of Freud's theory.
Dollard and Miller conceived of anxiety as a secondary (learned) 
drive which served to energize the organism and produce behavior. The 
internal responses evoked by an anxiety-producing stimulus serve as 
cues to elicit further responses; anxiety reduction, like all drive 
reduction, is reinforcing.
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Thus, a neutral stimulus paired with a painful or anxiety- 
provoking stimulus would come to elicit internal responses which we 
label "an anxiety reaction." The anxiety reaction serves to elicit 
behaviors which, in the past, have been anxiety-reducing. "Phobias, 
inhibitions, avoidances, compulsions, rationalizations, and psycho­
somatic symptoms ... are responses that tend to reduce the conflict, 
and in part they succeed. When a successful symptom occurs, it is 
reinforced ...[and] ... is thus learned as a habit" (Dollard and 
Miller, 1950, p. 15). The acquisition of defense behaviors may there­
fore be interpreted in instrumental conditioning terms.
Of particular interest to the current study is Dollard and 
Miller's interpretation of repression in drive-reduction terms.
According to this formulation, repression may be considered a learned 
response in which the individual is reinforced, by anxiety reduction, for 
not attending to the anxiety-provoking thoughts. Thus, Dollard and 
Miller postulated that anxiety could condition the deployment of 
focal attention.
Dollard and Miller, as members of the Institute of Human 
Relations at Yale University, were deeply influenced by the ideas of 
Clark Hull. Another theory whose view of anxiety stems from Hull's 
theory is the drive-theoretic formulation of K. W. Spence.
Hull-Spence Drive Theory
Spence's drive theory had as its main focus the verification 
and refinement of Clark Hull's (1943) hypothetico-deductive systematic 
behavior theory. Thus, while drive theory research was often concerned 
with the effects of anxiety on learning, the central focus of the 
theory was on the effects of drive on learning generally. The choice 
of anxiety as the specific drive to be studied was almost incidental 
(Taylor, 1956). Because of the close relationship between drive 
theory and Hull's hypothetico-deductive system, it is necessary to 
briefly review some relevant parts of Hull's theory.
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Hull (1943) developed his theory to demonstrate that behavior 
theory could be extended, within the constraints imposed by behaviorism, 
to explain goal-seeking purposive behavior such as maze learning. Hull 
thus proposed to explain such phenomena as foresight and purpose using 
a stimulus-response model.
A major problem that Hull faced was to explain how a future goal 
could reinforce antecedent behaviors? that is, Hull had to account for 
the temporal non-contiguity of behavior and reinforcement. For example, 
the dogs in Pavlov's conditioning experiments, salivated before the 
actual food was present. Similarly, food ingestion terminates food- 
seeking behavior before the nutrients in the food have been released 
to compensate for tissue deficits.
Hull's construct of fractional anticipatory goal response 
provided an integrative link to explain anticipatory behavior. The
fractional anticipatory goal response was conceived of as an
intervening response which by itself does not totally reduce 
drive and therefore does not lead to a cessation of goal directed 
behavior. But the fractional anticipatory response can serve as a 
cue which elicits subsequent (goal-directed) responses.
Atkinson (1964) pointed out a number of consequences of Hull's
theory with regard to "purposive" goal-seeking behavior:
If the organism fails to reach a goal, it will continue
to attempt to seek the goal because of the persistence
of the internal drive, and goal stimulus.
If the organism fails to achieve the goal, the original
response will tend to become extinguished and an 
alternate, weaker, response will become dominant.
Individual differences in behavior result from the 
different antecedent response histories of the 
organism.
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The temporal sequence of responses is a function of the 
strengths of the competing responses which is dependent 
upon the organism's antecedent reinforcement history.
Useless responses (e.g., those that do not lead to 
reinforcement) may reappear through the process of spontaneous 
recovery.
K. W. Spence carried on Hull's hypothetico-deductive approach 
and the confluence of the two theories has become known as Hull- 
Spence drive theory.
One aspect of Spence's investigations concerned the effects of 
drive on learning. In conjunction with Janet Taylor, Spence conducted 
experiments investigating the effects of aversive motivational factors 
in learning (Spence, 1958). Spence-Hull drive theory was a significant 
impetus to research in test anxiety (Spence and Spence, 1966), 
although the theory was not concerned with the higher level cognitive 
processes characteristic of most academic tasks.
In its most general terms, drive theory conceptualized anxiety 
as an acquired drive which had the property of energizing responses 
by increasing their magnitude. The magnifying effects of anxiety on 
response magnitude is a readily observed phenomenon. "Clinically, 
one thinks of the tense, 'jumpy' person who responds quickly and with 
relative intensity to minor stimuli" (Levitt, 1967, p. 112). In the 
case of very simple learning situations (such as respondent condition­
ing) in which only one response is possible, drive theory predicts 
that anxiety will facilitate learning. The effects of anxiety on 
more complex learning are not so straightforward, and in certain 
situations anxiety will have a deleterious effect on learning.
Spence's anxiety theory was derived from some basic assumptions 
of Hull's learning theory. According to Hull (1943) the magnitude of 
a response may be a function of an intervening variable E (excitatory 
potential) which is itself a function of habit strength, H and a 
generalized drive level, D. In particular, E is assumed to be a 
multiplicative function of habit strength and drive level.
E = F(H X D)
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According to Hull, "habit strength is a simple positive growth 
function of the number of reinforcements" (1943, p. 179).
Drive, the basic multiplier of habit strength, activates habit 
into reaction potential. Drive reduction is primary reinforcement. 
When a stimulus is associated with primary reinforcement, it becomes 
the object of a conditioned or acquired drive.
Figure 1 diagrams the relationships postulated by drive theory 
in the case of simple aversive conditioning.
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S , ES , S , , , Ru u shock a
N: the number of paired conditioning trials
S : the conditioned stimulusc
S , ES , S . , R : indeoendent variables whichu u shock a
have been manipulated in various studies
S : the unconditioned stimulusu
ES^: the number of prior presentations of the unconditioned
stimulus
’shock1 sh°ck not Paired with the unconditioned or conditioned 
stimulus
Ra : some measure of emotional responsiveness (such as the
score on the Manifest Anxiety Scale).
Figure 1. Spence's postulated relationships in the case 
of respondent aversive conditioning. Adapted from Spence 
and Spence, 1966.
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As can be seen from Figure 1, the probability and magnitude of the 
response, R^, is the multiplicitive function described above. It should 
be noted that habit strength, H, is conceived of as a direct function 
of the number of pairings. Drive is mediated by a hypothetical mechanism 
r^ which is a "persistent emotional response aroused by aversive stimuli" 
(Spence and Spence, 1966, p. 293).
Spence drew two implications from the above model: (1) D would
be a function of the intensity of S^ (hence would also vary with Sy) 
and (2) there would be individual differences in response to a noxious 
stimulus; that is, individuals with a high level of emotional 
responsiveness would tend to exhibit faster conditioning for a given 
number of trials than would an individual with less emotional 
responsiveness. The Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (Taylor, 1953) 
was designed to assess individual differences in emotional responsive­
ness .
In general, research has supported the drive theory with respect 
to simple learning tasks such as eyelid conditioning (Spence, 1964). 
Similar results have been shown in paired-associated learning tasks 
(Atkinson, 1964). Atkinson noted that when the strength of association 
is controlled for inpaired associate learning tasks, Ss with a high 
MAS score (hence presumably Ss high in r ) do better than Ss with low 
MAS scores if the association has high initial habit strength (blue- 
sky) or low initial habit strength (book-dog). Thus, when there is 
a single response or when habit strength is initially very high for 
the correct response, anxiety has a facilitating effect on learning 
(Spence, 1958).
The effect of anxiety drive on more complex tasks is not as 
easily determined. One problem is that it is difficult to define 
exactly what is meant by a complex task. A discussion of this 
problem may be found in Spence and Spence (1966) in which the problems 
of translating the concept of intra-task competition into task complex­
ity are considered. In general, since anxiety is presumed to have a 
non-specific, energizing effect on all competing habits, the theory 
would predict that the performance of the high anxiety and low anxiety
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groups would be a function of the relative strengths of the competing 
response tendencies (Taylor, 1956). Because the relationship between 
drive and habit strength is multiplicative, an increase in drive 
strength would tend to increase the difference between competing 
responses. If the correct response were initially weaker than one 
or more incorrect competitors, the effect would be to degrade 
performance more for high-anxious than for low-anxious subjects.
If drive were strong it may multiply very weak responses enough to 
make them major competitors in the response hierarchy and thus 
further decrease the probability of a correct response (Taylor, 1956).
A number of studies have supported the hypothesis that low MAS 
subjects tend to perform better than high MAS subjects where response 
competition is a factor (Atkinson, 1964). When verbal or stylus mazes 
were used, more errors were made by high-anxious subjects at the most 
difficult choice points.
Spence and Spence (1966) note that the data on intra-task 
competition should not be generalized to statements about task difficulty. 
They point out that depending upon the degree of intra-task competition, 
the results in paired-associate tasks can either be the same as in 
conditioning (that is, high-anxious individuals are superior to low- 
anxious individuals) or the reverse may be the case. The theory does 
not deal with problem-solving tasks and hence, predictions about this 
type of behavior cannot be made.
Because drive theory is not relevant to problem-solving environments, 
it is surprising that much research on anxiety in academic situations has 
been linked to drive theory. It is probable that much of this work was 
inspired by the availability of the Manifest Anxiety Scale (MAS), a 
questionnaire measure of anxiety developed by Janet Taylor.
The suggestion that a self-inventory instrument which would 
reflect differences in manifest anxiety could be a useful means of 
assessing Hull's D was initially presented by Taylor (1951) in her 
doctoral dissertation. Because Taylor's purpose was the measurement 
of drive, "the construction of the test was not aimed at developing 
a clinically useful instrument which would diagnose anxiety but rather 
was designed solely to select Ss differing in general drive level"
(Taylor, 1953, p. 303). Thus, the Manifest Anxiety Scale (MAS) was
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not developed with regard to a theoretical definition of anxiety 
embedded in a nomological network. It is on these grounds that the 
MAS has been criticized as lacking construct validity (Jessor and 
Hammond, 1957). Despite various criticisms, however, the MAS has 
become a widely used instrument; perhaps its popularity derives, in 
part, from its origination from the popular Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory (MMPI).
The MAS was constructed by submitting approximately 200 itens 
from the MMPI to five clinicians who judged the items as being 
indicative or non-indicative of manifest anxiety. Sixty-five items 
on which at least 80% agreement was obtained were combined with 135 
"buffer items" and were administered to an initial sample of college 
undergraduates. On the basis of correlations between individual items 
and total anxiety score, the number of items was reduced to 50.
Expansion of the buffer items to 175 resulted in a version of the 
test with 225 true-false items. In a later version, some of the 
items were reworded in order to reduce their reading level and their 
ambiguity (Taylor, 1953).
Taylor reported test-retest correlations in the range of .68 to .89 
with the correlations generally in the range of .81 to .89 (Taylor, 1953).
Significant correlations have also been reported among the MAS, a 
self-rating scale of anxiety, and the Psycho-somatic Inventory (Davids, 
1955). A high correlation between the MAS and the Pt scale of the MMPI 
has been reported (Brackbill and Little, 1954). The MAS has also been 
shown to correlate with the Winne Neuroticism Scale (Kerrick, 1955). A 
number of variants of the MAS have been published including a forced 
choice version, a 20 item short form, and a version for use with 
elementary school children (Levitt, 1967).
Spence and his co-workers have performed numerous studies using 
the MAS. Reviews of this work will be found in: (I. Sarason, (1960);
Spence, (1958); Spence & Spence, (1966); and Taylor, (1956). In general, 
the subjects who score high on the MAS tend to exhibit faster respondent 
conditioning than do subjects who score low on the scale. With more 
complex types of learning, the results are less clear.
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Because the MAS is a very general measure of anxiety, it is not 
a useful predictor of anxiety reactions in response to test-induced 
stress. Accordingly, the MAS was deemed unsuitable for the current 
study. A more appropriate instrument for the purpose emerged from 
Mandler and Sarason's (1952) interference hypothesis.
The Mandler-Sarason Interference Model
Prior to 1950, there were relatively few studies of the effects
of anxiety on learning. In 1950, S. Sarason noted that the nature
and role of drive states was both theoretically and practically
relevant to the testing situation. Two years later, Mandler and
Sarason (1952) published their seminal article which is generally
credited with having introduced the construct of test anxiety to the
psychological community.
In their article introducing test anxiety, Mandler and Sarason
(1952) proposed a formulation involving two types of drives: task-
drives (S ) and anxiety-drive (S ). Task-drives were considered t a
learned drives which are a function of both the particular task
presented to the subject and the instructions which accompany it.
Task-drives were presumed to include the need to achieve and the need
to complete the task. Task-responses, denoted bv the symbol R^, were
defined as responses (or response sequences) which lead to a reduction
in St and to completion of the task.
Anxietv-drive (S ) was considered to be a learned drive which a
developed in response to anxiety reactions previously encountered in 
the testing situation. The manifestation of anxiety-drive was there­
fore the result of generalization from previous testing experiences 
in which anxiety was aroused. Two classes of responses which could 
reduce the anxiety-drive were postulated. The first type of response, 
denoted by the symbol, Rat> were responses which tended to reduce 
anxiety-drive by facilitating the completion of the task. These 
responses were considered functionally equivalent to the task-drive 
reducing responses Rt» In contrast, a second class of responses,
denoted bv the symbol R , were considered self-directed and would bea
manifested by attempts to escape from the test situation, by somatic
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arousal, by feelings of helplessness and fear of loss of esteem. 
Responses which are Rfl would not facilitate completion of the task.
In their model (Figure 2), Mandler and Sarason postulated that 
the overt responses of the subject were mediated by intervening 
responses which lead either to task-relevant activity which would 
facilitate task completion or task-irrelevant activity which would 
interfere with task completion.
As can be seen from the model in Figure 2 , anxiety may either 
facilitate or interfere with task completion depending upon the 
responses evoked. Mandler and Sarason proposed that the R responses 
which are facilitating would be task-specific and thus would not be 
in the response repertoire of the subject. They would therefore be 
learned during the course of task performance. R responses, on the
Si
other hand, were not assumed to be task-specific but were presumed to 
be in the subject's repertoire and would be evoked in the test situation 
because of stimulus generalization from previous testing situations. 
Since individuals with a high anxiety drive would tend to have a 
large number of R responses available, they would tend to make large
cl
numbers of these responses. Individuals with a low anxiety drive 
would presumably have fewer R^ responses available to them and would 
therefore tend to learn and exhibit more R responses than the high 
anxiety subject.
Whereas the Spence-Taylor theory of anxiety as an energizing 
drive (D) treated anxiety as a general personality trait, the Mandler- 
Sarason theory was more concerned with situational anxiety. Levitt 
noted that "[in the Mandler-Sarason hypothesis] The effect of anxiety 
is ... a function of ... the attitude of the experimenter or teacher 
and the meaning of the task as perceived by the individual. These 
factors are of greater significance than the complexity or difficulty 
per se" (1967, p. 115). This concern with the situational aspects 
of test anxiety is reflected in an early investigation (Sarason,
Mandler, & Craighill, 1952), in which the type of instructions 
presented to subjects were varied. One group received expected to 
finish instructions which indicated that the "average college student" 







NOT RELEVANT TO TASK
(anxiety drive)
Figure 2. Drive-Response relationships in the Mandler-Sarason 
Model. Adapted from Mandler and Sarason (1952).
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received not expected to finish instructions which indicated that the 
task was too difficult for anyone to finish in the time allotted. 
Actually, the task was too difficult for anyone to finish. It was 
anticipated that, in accordance with the theory described above, 
stressful instructions would facilitate performance of low anxiety 
groups while interfering with the performance of high anxiety groups: 
in general, these predictions were confirmed.
In summary, the Mandler-Sarason hypothesis predicts that high 
anxiety subjects will tend to exhibit task-irrelevant responses in a 
stressful situation while low anxiety subjects will tend to exhibit 
task-facilitating responses in a stressful situation. A differential 
effect on performance as a function of anxiety level is thus predicted.
It is interesting to compare the Mandler-Sarason text anxiety 
model with the achievement motivation models of McClelland and Atkinson, 
(cf. Atkinson, 1964; McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, and Lowell, 1953). The 
task-drives postulated by the Mandler-Sarason model are similar to the 
need for achievement (n ach) state which McClelland and Atkinson 
investigated. Atkinson (1964) described two "need states" that were 
presumed to be evoked in an achievement situation: need for achievement
and fear of failure. These two need states are quite similar to 
Mandler and Sarason's S and Sa< In fact, while the TAT is usually used 
to measure n ach, the most commonly used measure of fear of failure is 
the Test Anxiety Questionnaire developed in conjunction with Mandler- 
Sarason interference theory.
The most widely used instrument for the assessment of test 
anxiety has been the Mandler-Sarason Test Anxiety Questionnaire (TAQ).
The original TAQ was used in the initial study of test anxiety 
(Mandler and S. Sarason, 1952). The first version of the TAQ asked 
the student to rate various questions on a 15 centimeter scale. An 
example of a TAQ item is:
Before taking an examination, to what extent do you worry?
Worry a lot Worry not at all
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The student would mark the appropriate point on the line. Scoring of 
the TAQ was complex (Levitt, 1967). Each student's responses were 
measured and scored according to how many centimeters from the edge 
of the line the mark was made. When all subjects were scored, the 
group median for each item was computed. Students whose mark fell 
above the group median received a score of 1 for the item. If the 
point on the line fell below the group median for the item, a score of 
0 was assigned. The total anxiety score was obtained by summing the 
individual item scores. In effect, this scoring technique indicated 
the number of items for which the individual's response was above the 
group median.
Scoring the TAQ was a tedious process and S. Sarason and Gordon
(1953) developed norms for Yale undergraduates. However, the applic­
ability of these norms to other populations is questionable.
I. Sarason (1972) has developed a true-false test anxiety scale. 
Known as the Test Anxiety Scale (TAS) this inventory consists of 37 
items such as:
During a course examination I frequently get so nervous 
that I forget facts I really do know.
The TAS is highly correlated with the TAO but is significantly easier 
to administer. Because of its similarity to the TAO, and the ease of 
scoring, the TAS was used in the current study.
Morris and Liebert's Worrv-Emotionalitv
The generally low correlations between autonomic arousal and 
pencil and paper measures of anxiety such as the Taylor MAS and the 
Mandler-Sarason TAQ have led psychologists to speculate that these 
inventories may be measuring a component of anxiety other than arousal. 
Liebert and Morris (1967) noted that factor analytic studies of the 
TAQ tended to reveal two classes of factors. They labeled one class 
as worry (W) factors and the other class as emotionality (E) factors.
Worry factors are cognitive. They relate to cognitive concern 
about failure and self-image. They are expressed as statements of
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inadequacy and lack of confidence. Emotional factors, on the other 
hand, reflect perceptions of autonomic arousal. Liebert and Morris 
hypothesized that worry would be inversely related to the perceived 
expectancy. Presumably, individuals who perceive that they are likely 
to fail at a task will be concerned with the consequences of that 
failure; while those who anticipate success will not express such 
concern.
In order to test the hypothesis, Liebert and Morris (1967) 
administered a modified form of the TAO to students just prior to 
course examination. The modified TAQ consisted of 11 items. Five 
items were presumed to measure worry while five items were presumed 
to measure emotionality. Unlike the standard TAO, the subjects were 
asked to report their state anxiety with respect to the immediately 
pending examination.
The remaining item asked the students to rate their expectation 
of success on the examination relative to their aspirations. This 
rating was expressed as a probability and was used to divide the 
subjects into High (.7 to 1.0), Medium (.4 to .6), and Low (0.0 to .3) 
expectancy groups. The relationship between expectancy group to the 
five item worry subscale was significant at the .0005 level. A signi­
ficant relationship was not obtained between expectancy level and the 
emotionality subscale.
Doctor and Altman (1969) reasoned that worry, because of its 
cognitive nature, should have an interfering effect upon intellective 
performance. Emotionality was not hypothesized to have this effect 
unless the autonomic arousal reached a level which was annoying. In a 
pretest-posttest design, Doctor and Altman (1969) found that both 
worry and emotionality dropped significantly following completion of 
a final examination in psychology. Worry seemed to have an inter­
fering effect on test performance, irrespective of the students 
expectancies of success.
Since emotionality is assumed to be a reflection of autonomic 
arousal, it would be expected to correlate with physiological measures. 
If such correlations were observed, the low correlations between
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physiological measures and standard anxiety inventories could be 
ascribed to the confounding presence of worry factors in the overall 
anxiety scores.
Morris and Liebert (1970) measured pulse rate changes from a 
neutral (normal class) to a stress (examination) situation. Pulse rate 
change scores were related to worry, emotionality, and expectancy 
scores. They found that both worry and emotionality were related to 
pulse rate change; differences between the correlations were not 
significant.
In the current study, worry and emotionality were measured by the 
state worry-emotionality scale (Morris and Fulmer, 1977). The students' 
expectancies of success were measured on a ten—point scale similar to 
that used by Liebert and Morris (1967).
Spielberger1s State-Trait Theory
Although some people are considered more anxious than others, 
even the most anxious person is not experiencing anxiety every moment of 
every day. In all people there are temporal fluctuations in the mani­
festations of anxiety reactions; fluctuations that are the result of 
environmental factors and the person's perception of anxiety provoking 
stimuli.
R. B. Cattell (1966) distinguished between anxiety as a trait 
(characterological anxiety) and anxiety as an emotional state.
Spielberger (1966b; 1972) has formalized a state-trait conception 
of anxiety. According to Spielberger's model, trait anxiety (A-trait) 
"implies a motive or acquired behavioral disposition that predisposes 
an individual to perceive a wide range of objectively non-dangerous 
circumstances and threatening, and to respond to these with A-state 
reactions disproportionate in intensity to the magnitude of the object­
ive danger." (1966b, p. 17). Trait-State anxiety theory postulates 
(Spielberger, 1972), that when a stimulus is perceived as threaten­
ing:
(1) an A-State reaction will occur
(2) the intensity of the A-State reaction will be a function 
of the perceived magnitude of the threat.
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(3) the duration of the reaction will depend upon the 
persistence of the evoking stimulus
(4) A-State reactions are experienced as unpleasant and 
perception of this unpleasant state via cognitive and 
sensory mechanisms will tend to evoke defense reactions 
which have, in the past, reduced A-State.
(5) Some individuals will develop effective, as opposed to 
defensive, reactions to A-State and will therefore respond 
to A-State arousal by initiating effective coping reactions.
Spielberger has developed a model which illustrates the relation­
ship between state and trait anxiety in Figure 3. According to this 
model, the cognitive appraisal of a stimulus as dangerous or threatening 
evokes a state anxiety reaction. The appraisal of a particular stimulus 
situation as threatening is influenced in part, by the person's 
acquired disposition to respond anxiously to evaluative situations 
(trait-anxiety). The occurrence of an anxiety reaction may initiate 
behavioral sequences intended to avoid the danger situation.
Sequences intended to reduce state anxiety by cognitive reappraisal 
of the situation are called defense mechanisms, and may be general 
responses or coping maneuvers specific to the stimulus situation.
Because of his concern that the state and trait anxiety be 
operationally, as well as theoretically, distinct, Spielberger developed 
two scales which collectively are known as the State Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI). A description of the scale, its construction and 
validation will be found in Spielberger, Gorsuch and Lushene (1970).
For experimental use where it is desired to measure fluctuations in 
state anxiety, a special short form of the scale may be used. There 
is also a children's version (Spielberger, Edwards, Montuori, and 
Lushene, 1973). In the current study, trait anxiety was measured by 
the Test Anxiety Scale (I. Sarason, 1972) and state anxiety was measured 
by the State Worry/Emotionality scale (Morris and Fulmer, 1976).
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Attentional Formulations
An attentional reinterpretation of the Mandler-Sarason theory was 
proposed by Wine (1970) in a doctoral dissertation, and subsequently 
published in Psychological Bulletin (1971). Wine's formulation (which 
has been called the cognitive-attentional or alternation hypothesis) 
attempted to explain the performance differences between high and low 
test anxious persons in terms of the different ways in which these 
persons are presumed to deploy their attentional focus.
According to Wine (1970, p. 1) "the low test anxious person is 
focused on task-relevant variable while performing tasks. The highly 
test anxious person is internally focused on self-evaluative, self- 
deprecatory thinking, and perception of his autonomic responses. Since 
the difficult tasks on which the test anxious person does poorly 
require full attention for adequate performance, he cannot perform 
adequately while dividing his attention between internal cues and task 
cues."
Subsequent to Wine's (1971) publication of the alternation model,
I. Sarason (1972) published a review of a number of studies in which he 
reached a similar conclusion. In this review, Sarason noted that "what 
distinguishes the high test anxious individual are (1) the manner in 
which he attends to the events of his environment and (2) how he inter­
prets and utilizes the information provided by these events." He 
noted that pre-performance variables (e.g. instructions, audience 
observation) play a crucial role in the way that high-anxious persons 
perform. Evaluative or achievement-oriented environments seem to have 
a negative effect on the performance of high anxious subjects but a 
positive effect on the performance of low-anxious subjects. Sarason 
argued that low-anxious people in an achievement-oriented condition are 
motivated to perform at high levels and tend to focus their attention 
more fully on the task at hand. In contrast, the high-anxious person 
tends to personalize the achievement-oriented situation and "(1) neglects 
or misinterprets information cues that may be readily available to him 
or (2) experiences attentional blocks."
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The relationship between attention and anxiety is central to the 
current study and will be discussed in Chapter II. The remainder of 
the current chapter is devoted to an explicated, integrated view of the 
anxiety construct derived from the theories discussed above.
An Integrative View of Anxiety
Although psychologists differ in their description of anxiety, 
few would dispute that anxiety is experienced primarily as an affect 
or feeling-state which, as Freud (1923) noted, is identifiable by its 
specific unpleasurable quality. In his review of theories of anxiety, 
Fischer (1970) stressed that anxiety is always a mode of experiencing.
A person does not feel anxious except within the context of experiencing 
a situation— that is, a person experiences anxiously rather than 
experiencing anxiety. This is true even in the case of "free-floating" 
anxiety.
Anxiety is generally distinguished from fear in that anxiety 
either occurs in the absence of an objectively dangerous stimulus 
situation or is disproportionate to the objective threat. However, 
anxiety and fear appear to be essentially similar constructs (Mowrer, 
1939); anxiety may be regarded as a fear reaction whose source is not 
attributable to the stimulus situation. Since the source of the fear 
is not in the environment, it must come from the individual.
The notion that the source of anxiety is within the individual 
was advanced by James (1890), although he regarded anxiety reactions 
as instinctive rather than learned. However, Pavlov in his studies 
of experimental neurosis and Watson in his studies of emotional 
conditioning soon discovered that anxiety was a learned reaction which 
could be conditioned by associating a neutral stimulus (CS) with a 
stimulus which elicited a pain or fear reaction (UCS) . Following 
conditioning, presentation of the previously neutral stimulus would 
elicit a conditioned anxiety reaction (Mowrer, 1939).
It appears, therefore, that anxiety is a learned reaction which 
is based on previous pain or fear experiences. Through association 
with painful and fear-evoking stimuli, neutral stimuli acquire the 
ability to elicit anxiety reactions.
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The elicitation of an affective state by a stimulus which serves
as a partial memory cue is a common experience which has been termed
redintegration. Redintegrated affect is central to McClelland's 
hedonic motivation theory which suggests that approach and avoidance 
behaviors can be explained in terms of redintegrated pleasurable and 
unpleasurable affects. Although McClelland's theory is not adequate 
to explain all motivated behavior, the role of redintegrated affect 
in motivation is extremely important.
The Role of Generalization
The role of redintegrated affect in controlling behavior is 
important to the survival of the individual.
In particular, the conditioned anxiety response is highly adaptive
because it provides the organism with a motive to avoid potentially
dangerous situations. A child who touches a hot stove and burns her 
hand will experience an anxiety reaction in the future when she 
approaches the stove and will avoid it. Dollard and Miller (1950) 
have shown that the gradient of the avoidance behavior increases as 
the stimulus object is approached.
If an organism were forced to experience every possible danger 
situation before it learned appropriate avoidance behaviors, it might 
not survive very long. Fortunately, the anxiety reaction is not specific 
to the original fear producing stimulus. Through stimulus general­
ization, cues similar to the original fear-producing stimulus will 
elicit an anxiety-reaction. Thus, the child who burned her hand on a 
hot stove will avoid all stoves in the future and probably other objects 
perceived as similar.
Both human and infrahuman organisms are capable of stimulus 
generalization. However, humans alone interpret their environment 
cognitively because they possess a rich and deeply integrated conceptual 
structure which affects their perception, interpretation, and organiza­
tion of stimuli in memory. Because of their cognitive capabilities, 
the process of generalization in humans is more complex than in other 
organisms.
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Through the process of generalization, a stimulus will redintegrate 
anxiety states if it is perceived as similar to stimuli that were 
previously associated with anxiety or pain. When perceived similarity
is conceptual rather than physical, the relationship between the 
anxiety-evoking object and the original source of the fear may not 
be obvious. Thus, a pilot may become fearful of elevators following 
a plane crash; the similarity of the elevator to the plane is more 
conceptual than configural. Salzman (1973) suggested 
that the distinction between simple stimulus generalization and 
conceptual or "symbolic" generalization was a very important one.
He argued that simple avoidance conditioning should be distinguished 
from "true phobia" on the grounds that the former is generally readily 
extinguished by appropriate conditioning techniques while the latter 
is less responsive to reduction by reciprocal inhibition. The 
distinction between stimuli which evoke anxiety states as a result of 
simple generalization and those which involve a conceptual association 
("symbolic transformation") is often ignored in psychological 
research.
The reason that few psychological researchers have studied the 
role of conceptual generalization in anxiety lies in the highly 
idiosyncratic nature of conceptual phenomenon. Every concept, in 
addition to its denotative structure, carries with it a personalized 
connotative structure which is formed as a result of the individual's 
experiences. Because of the idiosyncratic nature of these experiences, 
the connotative structure (unlike the denotative structure) does not 
have a high degree of social concensus.
For example, the denotative structure of the concept "dog" 
includes such criterial attributes as size, general shape, type 
of vocalization, eating habits, and typical modes of motor activity.
In most cases, the identification of an animal as a dog poses no problem; 
most people will agree as to whether a particular quadraped is a dog or 
cat.
The connotative aspects of the concept "dog," however, will vary 
considerably among individuals. To some people, the concept "dog" 
carries connotations like: pet, furry, friendly, companion, guardian;
to others the connotations might include dirty, noisy, and dangerous.
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Although a person's classification of a particular animal as a dog is 
generally unaffected by the idiosyncratic connotative structure, the 
person's affective reaction to a dog is governed by the connotative 
structure. The highly affective nature and the lack of social consensus 
regarding a concept's connotative structure is obvious when one considers 
concepts such as "sex-education," "marijuana," and "abortion."
Not only are stimuli which evoke anxiety through conceptual general­
ization idiosynratic, but they may be illogical as well. It is well- 
known that irrelevant stimuli often become conditioned as a result of 
incidental continuity with a reinforcer. This is the basis of classical 
conditioning since any CS (e.g., Pavlov's bell) may be causally irrele­
vant to the response evoked by the UCS. Dollard and Miller (1950) have 
pointed out the importance of incidental stimuli which become cues to 
evoke anxiety.
For example, consider the experience of an infant, left unattended 
by its mother at night. The mother's failure to respond to the child's 
discomfort means that the infant is left in a helpless and unpleasant 
feeling-state for some period of time. The darkness, originally a 
neutral stimulus, by association will become a cue to elicit anxiety 
states. Because the experience of being alone and uncomfortable in the 
dark is an almost universal experience, fear of the dark in later life 
is a common, and socially shared, experience. However, other neutral 
stimuli may acquire similar significance in individual situations. If 
the infant were exposed to the sound of a radio playing in an adjoining 
room, during the period of abandonment, in later life the individual 
might experience anxiety when exposed to the sound of a radio or 
television.
The Spread of Anxiety
In addition, the individual might generalize along conceptual 
(symbolic) lines and develop anxiety reactions to objects or situations 
associated with radios. Thus, the individual might experience anxiety 
in a movie theater, a car, or a concert. The relationship between 
these fears and the original conditioned stimulus would appear quite 
remote to the outside observer.
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It is well-known that some anxiety reactions have a characteristic 
tendency to spread over time (Salzman, 1973). This spread 
may occur in two ways: an anxiety-evoking stimulus may come to elicit
more affect than previously and the range of cues which elicit an anxiety 
reaction may increase.
The spread of anxiety may be accounted for by conditioning through 
reflective thought. When an individual perceives that a neutral stimulus 
is conceptually associated with an anxiety-provoking stimulus the two 
concepts are associated in the presence of anxiety evoked by the latter. 
The previously neutral stimulus, acquires the attribute of evoking 
anxiety by conditioning.
The more often an anxiety-evoking concept is attended to, the more 
often the individual will experience an anxiety response. The individual 
is, therefore, reinforced by anxiety-reduction for shifting focal 
attention away from anxiety-evoking memories. It is probable that the 
individual's style of concept formation is influenced by this factor.
If a stimulus is not adequately attended-to it cannot be fully processed. 
Concepts which arouse anxiety will tend to form less rich associations 
than those which do not arouse anxiety. This has important implications 
for school learning.
A factor contributing to school failure is the student's inability 
to learn in a sufficiently meaningful wav. In these students school 
experiences are not integrated into an increasingly rich academic 
cognitive structure but are stored in disconnected, skeletal compart­
ments. The view set forth here suggests that this type of school 
failure may be traced to cognitive avoidance responses to aspects of 
the school situation which evoke anxiety and prevent the student from 
fully attending to school experiences. This notion is consistent with 
Spielberger's (1966a) findings relating anxiety to academic failure.
The school environment is a complex social system which is of 
major importance in the reinforcement history of the child and, there­
fore, is a potent force in the connotative structures the child 
develops in the context of school. The fact that the child is part of 
a peer group whose social approval is deeply important and is under
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the constant scrutiny of an authoratative adult makes the school 
environment a highly potent source of social reinforcement. Few 
individuals cannot recall a number of school-linked experiences which 
affected them deeply. Because the school environment is so potent, 
anxiety responses learned in the early grades may affect the acquisition 
of appropriate learning strategies and produce lasting patterns of 
maladaptive school behavior. For example, a child who is disliked by 
her first grade teacher may tend to develop strong anxiety feelings 
associated with the concept "teacher". Such an individual is unlikely 
to develop good relationships with teachers in the future because every 
subsequent teacher, by definition, will be an anxiety-provoking stimulus.
Anxiety Reducing Behaviors
Defense behaviors are behaviors which function to reduce anxiety 
states (Spielberger, 1972). Many defenses are attentional because a 
stimulus not attended to cannot sustain an anxiety reaction. Many 
defense behaviors are habits that are conditioned by anxiety reduction 
(Dollard and Miller, 1950); since a behavior which effects anxiety 
reduction will be reinforced, it may become habitually evoked by anxiety 
cues.
One of Dollard and Miller's most important contributions to the 
construct of anxiety was their recognition of the fact that anxiety 
arousal involved elements which could function as cues to elicit operant 
responses. This notion has been incorporated in Spielberger's (1972) model 
and is related to Schacter's (1964) investigations of affect labeling.
Worry and Emotionality
It has long been recognized that anxiety has both physiological 
and cognitive components. A number of theorists have suggested that 
the physiological responses are the primary cues that permit the 
individual to recognize anxiety; this notion may be traced back to the 
James-Lange theory of emotion. More recently Schacter (1964) has 
presented evidence for a two factor theory of emotion. Liebert and
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Morris (1967) have developed research scales to measure the worry 
and emotionality components of anxiety.
The distinction between emotionality and worry is both intuitive­
ly satisfying and theoretically consistent with the view presented 
here. An individual describing an acute anxiety experience is apt to 
characterize its onset as a "sudden icyness". This feeling appears to 
occur immediately following perception of an anxiety-provoking stimulus 
and before cognitive appraisal of the stimulus situation really occurs. 
This pattern is especially dramatic in the case of extreme phobic 
anxiety reactions in which a person may experience so rapid and strong 
a physiological reaction as to become faint upon exposure to an object­
ively harmless stimulus (such as seeing another person injured).
The primacy of the emotionality component of anxiety follows from 
its nature as a conditioned response. It has been pointed out that 
anxiety may be regarded as redintigrated physical discomfort. Classical 
conditioning is the learning of physiological responses to a previously 
neutral stimulus through association with a stimulus which already
The formulations reviewed above suggest that the individual's first 
reaction to an anxiety-provoking stimulus may be physiological. At low 
levels of anxiety this probably results in an elevation of arousal level 
and generally increased alertness and vigilence. If the level of arousal 
is low, the increased alertness and vigilence will tend to improve per­
formance; this factor explains why researchers have consistently found 
that low levels of anxiety enhance performance— particularly on simple 
tasks (Spence, 1968).
As the level of anxiety increases, the individual's heightened 
emotionality becomes more attention-demanding and because of its 
unpleasurable character will elicit behaviors which, in the past, have 
been reinforced by anxiety reduction. Some defense behaviors are 
physiological and are antagonistic to the anxiety response; thus, the 
individual may attempt to relax skeletal muscles, or may attempt to 
reduce heartrate by deep breathing. Young children may suck on their 
thumb which probably elicits food-related somatic responses.
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Cognitive defense behaviors attempt to divert the individual's 
attention from the threatening aspects of the stimulus situation. If 
the stimulus is not sufficiently attention-compelling this may be 
accomplished but the individual may lose the opportunity to fully 
process all aspects of the stimulus configuration.
Some common defenses may be interpreted as shifts in attentional 
focus. The obsessive defense (Salzman, 1973) may be explained in 
attentional terms as may repression (Fischer, 1970). However, not all 
cognitive behaviors elicited by anxiety reduce the attention focused 
on the anxiety-provoking stimulus situation.
If habitual defense behaviors are inadequate to effect a decrease 
in anxiety behaviors, the individual will need to allocate attention to 
evaluating the nature of the threat and determining what behaviors 
will reduce it. This may be a difficult problem to solve since the 
individual may not be aware of the cause of the anxiety. The anxious 
individual will seek to account for his anxiety reactions. As Schacter's 
(1964) research has so vividly demonstrated, the labels that 
people use to explain their affective reactions may not be accurate.
In the case of test-anxiety, many of the evaluative thoughts 
appear to be personalized and self-deprecatory (Wine, 1971; I. Sarason, 
1972). This is not surprising considering that the most obvious 




THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG ANXIETY, ATTENTION,
AND SHORT-TERM MEMORY
The construct of anxiety was discussed in Chapter I from the 
perspectives of a number of theorists who have contributed signifi­
cantly to its description. When the complementary aspects of the 
various theories are viewed as contributing to a unified description 
of anxiety, a reasonably comprehensive formulation emerges.
One aspect of anxiety which has been an implicit component of 
all the theories reviewed, is the notion that the occurrence of an 
anxiety reaction affects the way that the individual attends to the 
environment. The relationship between anxiety and attention has 
recently been the subject of considerable interest among researchers 
(Wine, 1971; I. Sarason, 1972).
The current study investigated the hypothesis that anxiety, 
through its influence on attention, impairs rehearsal in short-term 
memory. In this chapter, the research evidence which supported the 
formulation of the hypothesis is reviewed.
Attention
Attention is a construct whose importance in learning is well 
understood. Children are exhorted to "pay attention" to their lessons 
in order to learn. Much the same idea was expressed in 400 B.C. when 
orators were told that "if you pay attention the judgement will better 
perceive the things going through it", (Norman, 1969a, p. 1) .
William James (1890) said that "an object once attended to will remain 
in the memory whilst one inattentively allowed to pass will leave no 
traces behind".
Although attention is an important part of everyday experience, 
it fell out of favor among psychologists in the second third of this
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century (Murray, 197A). According to Kahneman (1973) this decline in 
interest was the result of the pre-eminence of the Gestalt and 
Behaviorist schools. Attention, with its connotations of volition and 
purpose, was too "mentalistic" for American Behaviorism while the 
Gestaltists were more concerned with finding simple rules of perception. 
To both schools of psychology, attention was an unnecessary and unwanted 
construct.
Attention re-emerged in England with Mackworth's (1961) classic 
studies in vigilance and in America with Cherry's (1953) paper on the 
"cocktail party problem." The development of information processing 
approaches to psychology and, in particular, the information processing 
models of attention developed by Broadbent (1958) and Triesman (196A) 
have spurred research in attention.
Although William James felt that "every one knows what attention is," 
there has been considerable debate regarding its dimensions. This 
debate stems from the fact that attention is a multidimensional construct 
which reflects a system of complex, interactive cognitive processes.
Posner and Boies (1971) have suggested that attention be considered as 
having three distinct but related components: alertness, selectivity,
and processing capacity.
Although all theorists would not accept this taxonomy as complete, 
it provides a useful structure for the discussion which follows. 
Accordingly, each of the components is discussed below.
Alertness
The alertness component of attention has been investigated through 
studies of vigilance. Vigilance refers to a state of readiness in 
which an organism is alert to the occurrence of novel stimuli. Mackworth 
(1961) investigated vigilance by means of a special clock which had a 
hand that occasionally advanced two units in one jump. The subject was 
required to indicate the occurrence of a double jump by depressing a 
response key. Mackworth found that the number of errors increased with 
the time that the subject spent on the task. After about 30 minutes, 
adult subjects began to make many more errors. Adults became habituated
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more easily than children but Mackworth found that re-orienting the 
subject to the task decreased the error rate. Maximal alertness is 
attained when individuals receive a warning to prepare for an oncoming 
stimulus (Posner and Boies, 1971).
Closely tied to the concept of alertness or vigilance, is the much- 
studied orienting response. The orienting response (also called the 
orienting reaction or orienting reflex) was first studied by Pavlov who 
became interested in it as an element of his conditioning studies.
The orienting reaction is a complex physiological response to the 
introduction of novel stimuli into the environment. Its components 
include sensory orientation toward the stimulus. Physiological 
reactions include: dilation of the blood vessels in the head,
constriction of the peripheral blood vessels, changes in EEG, muscle 
tone, heart rate, and respiration.
The orienting reaction thus prepares the organism to receive and 
react to novel stimuli. The orienting reaction is dominant when it 
occurs simultaneously with a stimulus (such as sudden immersion of a 
hand in hot water) which would normally produce an antagonistic 
physiological reaction (Kahneman, 1973).
The orienting reaction habituates over time. Uno and Grings (1965) 
found that when a subject was exposed to a sequence of three tones, a 
strong GSR was elicited by the first and second tones but by the third 
tone, GSR was greatly reduced. The results of the Uno and Grings 
experiment and similar studies support the idea that the orienting 
response is related to expectation on the part of the organism; a 
pattern that is interrupted will elicit an orienting response while 
stimuli that are anticipated will not.
Selectivity
The notion of alertness is closely related to the notion of select­
ivity. Individuals select aspects of the environment to attend to; 
the orienting response is a highly adaptive mechanism which ensures that 
novel stimuli of potential importance to the organism's survival will 
not be ignored. Interest in selective attention was spurred by
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Cherry's (1953) investigation of the "cocktail party problem."
The cocktail party phenomenon is a familiar one to most people.
A person standing in a large room is able to separate conversation 
directed at him from the babble of voices composed of many irrelevant 
comments. The problem of how the individual manages to attenuate the 
undesirable signals and focus upon the personally-relevant signal was 
investigated by Cherry (1953) and Cherry and Taylor (1954).
Cherry used shadowing tasks in which the subject was required to 
shadow (reproduce) an aural message. Shadowing tasks differ from 
monitoring tasks such as those used in experiments of vigilance in 
that the subject in a shadowing task is required to repeat every word. 
Shadowing tasks normally use dichotic presentation methods in which 
the message to be shadowed is presented to one ear while an inter­
fering message is presented to the other.
Cherry found that subjects were aware of the interfering message 
but could not reproduce its content. In one experiment (Cherry, 1953) 
the interfering message was changed from English to German but the 
subjects were unaware of the switch.
The ease with which a subject can shadow a message depends upon 
the type of material being shadowed. Technical material is more 
difficult to shadow than prose and random words are harder than both; 
nonsense syllables are the most difficult to shadow (Norman, 1969a). 
Thus, meaning is an important element in shadowing as is grammatical 
structure.
Shadowing tasks are more difficult than monitoring tasks. The 
ability of a subject to respond to a target word ("press the response 
key when you hear the name of an animal") is not disturbed by the 
presence of an irrelevant message (Ninio and Kahneman, 1973). A 
monitoring task which is part of the cocktail party problem is the 
familiar sensation of hearing one's name in the midst of a babble of 
voices. Evidently, at least enough processing of the rejected message 
takes place to allow recognition of a critical phonemic sequence and 
initiate an orienting response.
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Processing Capacity
The hypothesis that attentional capacity varies with the individual's 
level of arousal is in accord with common sense notions of attention. In 
a relaxed state, the individual cannot pay close attention to stimuli; as 
the demands on attention increase, the individual's arousal increases as 
well.
Kahneman (1973) reviewed a series of split-span experiments conducted 
by Broadbent in the mid-1950's, in which the subjects were required to 
process two inputs simultaneously on different sensory channels (dichotic 
or aural-visual separation). When the stimulus rate exceeded one 
stimulus pair per second, subjects tended to group the inputs by channel 
or modality. It is interesting to note that the split-span phenomenon 
was known to 19th century astronomers because it caused confounding of 
their measurements and was discussed by James (1890) as the "law of 
prior entry."
Although individuals are able perform adequately in many tasks of 
divided attention, there are also situations in which the division of 
attention between messages becomes impossible. Mowbray (1953) found 
that subjects could not read a prose passage while listening to a 
different passage even when they attempted to divide their attention 
between the two. Other experimenters have found tasks in which divided 
attention was not possible.
According to Kahneman, "an even distribution of attention among 
concurrent activities is possible only at a low level of total effort.
When total effort is high, one of the activities typically draws most 
of the attention leaving little room for the others ...[this]... implies 
that attention is divisable at low levels and more nearly unitary at 
high levels of effort" (1973, p. 149).
Considerable research evidence exists to suggest that at high 
levels of arousal the allocation of attention becomes concentrated on 
the dominant aspects of the stimulus situation at the expense of 
peripheral aspects (Easterbrook, 1959).
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The increased focalization of attention at high levels of arousal 
is a commonly observed phenomenon. A person absorbed in intense 
activity may fail to process task-irrelevant cues. Thus, a driver, 
negotiating a difficult road, may ignore the conversation of her 
passengers. Generally, the increased focalization of attention at 
high levels of arousal facilitates completion of the task. However, 
under certain circumstances, the increased focalization accompanying 
arousal may reduce the individual's ability to complete the task.
In particular, there are three situations in which increased 
focalization may impair task performance (Kahneman, 1973):
1. When the task is complex and successful performance 
requires that attention be deployed over a wide 
range of cues.
2. When the task requires that the individual make 
fine discriminations in order to determine which 
cues are relevant. High arousal tends to impair 
fine discrimination and results in reduced ability 
to focus on relevant cues.
3. When the nature of the task requires divided rather 
than unitary attention.
The first two situations (tasks requiring a wide range of cue 
processing and tasks requiring fine discriminations) are characteristic 
of many academic problem-solving tasks. This suggests that if anxiety 
produces high levels of arousal, academic performance will tend to be 
impaired. Additionally, since high test anxiety appears to result in 
alternation of focal attention between task-relevant and anxiety-related 
cues, the third situation (divided attention at high levels of arousal) 
will serve to further disrupt performance.
The relationship between arousal level and task performance was 
the subject of a recent review (Broverman, Klaiber, Vogel, and 
Kobayashi, 1974). This review covered two classes of tasks: serially
repetitive overlearned tasks and perceptual restructuring tasks.
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Serially repetitive overlearned tasks are tasks which require 
that established chains of responses be made to serially repetitive 
stimuli. Broverman and his co-workers noted that "short-term stress 
should tend to enhance the maintenance of a narrow, well-focused, 
attention, thereby enhancing performance of tasks that do not require 
major response modification, utilization of novel cues, or change in 
set (1974, p. 673). Facilitating effects of arousal have been
observed in such tasks as: color naming, card sorting, simple
addition, visual counting, and eyelid conditioning. These results 
appear to be consistent with the predictions of drive theory (Spence, 
1964).
Broverman and his co-workers found that arousal impaired per­
formance on serially repetitive tasks that were not overlearned; 
these tasks include simple perceptual-motor tasks, verbal learning 
tasks, and the Minnesota Clerical and Form Board Tests. This effect 
is apparantly due to the fact that learning is still in process and 
the learning curve has not yet reached a plateau (Broverman, et. al., 
1974). These findings are also consistent with the notion of response 
competition derived from drive theory (Spence, 1964).
Perceptual restructuring tasks are defined as tasks which require 
the individual to set aside or inhibit immediate responses to obvious 
stimulus characteristics in favor of responses to nonobvious stimulus 
attributes. These tasks are likely to fit the three conditions 
specified above for which successful performance is likely to be 
impaired by narrowing of attentional focus.
Broverman and his co-workers noted that the expectation that 
short-term stress should impair performance on perceptual restructuring 
tasks has been repeatedly confirmed. "Failure-induced stress" has 
been reported to impair task performance on: anagrams, scrambled words,
mathematical problems, verbal coding, complex mazes, abstract reasoning, 
and a wide variety of similar tasks. The impaired performance of 
individuals on tasks of this type has been explained as resulting from 
rigid set and narrowed attentional focus (Broverman, et. al., 1974).
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The Hypothesized Relationship 
between Anxiety and Attention
As Liebert and Morris (1967) have noted, anxiety arousal has both 
a cognitive component and a somatic component. The somatic component, 
"emotionality," involves arousal, and drive theory has considered 
anxiety arousal to be equivalent to arousal by stressors such as hunger 
or thirst (Taylor, 1956). Accordingly, anxiety reactions would be 
expected to impair task performance due to narrowed attentional focus; 
numerous studies have confirmed this expectation (Broverman, et.al.,
1974; Harlston, 1962; Wine, 1971).
When individuals become anxious during task performance, their 
level of arousal will tend to increase. Their sub-optimal performance 
will tend to reinforce their anxiety reaction which will ultimately 
become attention-compelling itself. The attention-compelling aspect 
of the anxiety reaction will tend to conflict with the unitary 
attentional focus characteristic of high arousal and this leads to 
disorganized patterns of responding.
According to Wine, "the low test anxious person is focused on 
task-relevant variables while performing tasks. The highly test anxious 
person is internally focused on self-evaluative, self-deprecatory think­
ing, and perception of his autonomic responses. Since the difficult 
tasks on which the test anxious person does poorly require full attention 
for adequate performance, he cannot perform adequately while dividing 
his attention between internal cues and task cues" (1970, p. 1).
I. Sarason (1972) published a review in which he reached a similar 
conclusion. In this review, Sarason noted that "what distinguishes the 
high test anxious individual are (1) the manner in which he attends to 
the events of his environment and (2) how he interprets and utilizes 
the information provided by these events." Sarason noted that the pre­
performance variables (e.g. instructions, audience observation) play a 
crucial role in the way that high anxious persons perform. Evaluative
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or achievement-oriented environments seem to have a negative effect on 
the performance of high-anxious subjects but a positive effect on the 
performance of low-anxious subjects. Sarason argued that low-anxious 
people in an achievement-oriented condition would be motivated to 
perform at high levels and tend to focus their attention more fully on 
the task at hand. In contrast, high-anxious people would tend to 
personalize the achievement-oriented situation and (1) neglect or mis­
interpret information cues that may be readily available or (2) 
experience attentional blocks.
The research literature which relates increased arousal to 
reduced width of attentional focus has previously been discussed 
(Broverman et. al., 1974; Easterbrook, 1959). Following is a review 
of the key studies which support the hypothesis of attentional alter­
nation. As noted, reviews of this issue have been published by 
Wine (1971) and I. Sarason (1972).
The Alternation Hypothesis*
In a review of the relationship between scores on anxiety scales 
and scores on other questionnaire measures of personality, I. Sarason 
(1960) reported that persons who scored high on anxiety scales tended 
to describe themselves in self-deprecatory terms on other personality 
inventories. According to I. Sarason, "low scoring Ss may react to ... 
[threat] ... with increased effort and attention to the task at hand, 
high scoring Ss respond to threat with self-oriented personalizing 
responses" (1960, p.405).
In an experimental study, Doris and S. Sarason (1955), found that 
when subjects were arbitrarily failed on a number of tasks and were 
required to rank order statements which included "self-blame" and 
"other-than-self" blame items, anxious individuals blamed themselves 
for their failures significantly more than did their less anxious 
counterparts. Trapp and Kausler (1958) investigated performance and 
level of aspiration of high and low test anxious individuals on the
*This section generally follows Wine's (1971) review.
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Wechsler-Bellvue digit-symbol subtest. Though the performance of the 
high and low groups did not differ, the level of aspiration of high- 
anxious subjects degraded over four trials. Even though high-anxious 
subjects performed as well as low-anxious subjects, the high-anxiouS 
Ss became more pessimistic about their future performance over the four 
trials. Similar results were reported by Meunier and Rule (1967) who 
investigated the effects of positive, negative and no-feedback on 
subjects' confidence concerning their judgment of the length of lines.
On negative and no-feedback trials, highly test anxious subjects 
rated their confidence level as low. In contrast, low test anxious 
subjects expressed high confidence in their judgment on no-feedback 
trials.
Wine (1970) cited three studies (I. Sarason and Koenig, 1965;
I. Sarason and Oanzer, 1962, 1963) in which subjects were required to 
describe themselves orally for approximately one-half hour. Non-rein­
forcement, reinforcement of negative self-references, and reinforcement 
of positive self-references were compared. Wine summarized these findings 
noting that: "(a) Regardless of experimental condition, highly test
anxious subjects generally describe themselves in more negative terms 
than do low test anxious subjects. (b) High test anxious subjects are 
extremely responsive to reinforcement when the response class being 
reinforced is negative self-references. (c) However, when the response 
class being reinforced is positive self-references, high-anxious 
subjects do not produce more positive self-references as a result of 
verbal reinforcement" (1971, p. 94).
Following a series of tasks, Mandler and Watson (1966) administered 
a questionnaire to extreme low and high anxiety groups. Subjects 
responded to the question, "How often during the testing did you find 
yourself thinking how well, or how badly you seemed to be doing?", on a 
10 point rating scale. High test anxious subjects indicated markedly 
greater occurrence of such thoughts than did the low test anxious group.
In addition, high-anxious subjects engaged in more social comparison 
than low-anxious subjects. Neale and Katahn (1968) reported identical
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results on this questionnaire item. In a similar study (Marlett and 
Watson, 1968), ninth grade boys were arbitrarily failed for twelve 
trials on a button-pressing task. The subjects responded to the 
question, "How often did you think about how well or badly you were 
doing?" High test anxious subjects indicated that they were signifi­
cantly more disturbed by such self-focused thoughts.
Ganzer (1968) investigated the effects of audience presence and 
test anxiety on serial verbal learning and found that high TAS scorers 
emitted more task-irrelevant comments than any other group, and that 
most of these comments were self-evaluative or apologetic.
The studies cited above suggest that the test anxious person 
tends to become negatively self-focused under conditions of anxiety 
arousal and this self-preoccupation will tend to interfere with task- 
focused attention.
The Hypothesized Effect of Anxiety 
on Short-Term Memory
The normal human adult can easily repeat a list of from five to 
nine arbitrary digits, letters, or monosyllabic words. The storage 
medium for this data has been called short-term (or primary) memory. 
Primary memory is used both for the storage of auditory stimuli and 
for the storage of information recoded from visual input (Neisser,
1967). It has been hypothesized that all information to be stored in 
secondary (long-term) memory must first pass through a primary memory 
stage (Neisser, 1967; Norman, 1969a).
Miller (1956), in a comprehensive review of the literature, noted 
that the average adult could store seven arbitrary verbal symbols.
Strings of longer length could be stored if they were encoded ("chunked") 
into more inclusive cognitive units. It is normally most efficient to 
chunk data into the largest meaningful groupings. Thus, a meaningful 
symbol such as NBC, Ph.D., or CAT can be stored as a single chunk while 
a non-meaningful symbol such as XOM must be stored as three arbitrary
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verbal words (ex - queue - em). Even arbitrary lists, however, are 
subject to reformulation into rhythmic clusters or groups (Neisser,
1967).
The notion of rehearsal in primary memory is due to Brown (1958)
and has been explicated by Sperling (1967). According to Sperling
(1967), rehearsal may be conceptualized as a form of "inner speech"
(cf. Vygotsky, 1934) which protects data in primary memory from decay.
In addition, rehearsal is postulated to facilitate (or even cause) the
transfer of data to secondary memory. Norman (1969a) points out that
very little is known about rehearsal except that it is facilitating
(if not essential) to the learning of verbal material. Rehearsal is
closely related to speech; mistakes in retention often bear acoustical
relation to the correct item even if the item was presented visually
(Norman, 1969a). This implies the existence of an auditory encoding
process which is applied to visual material.
It is clear, however, that rehearsal is closely linked to attention.
According to Norman:
[One may note] the similarity of conditions that are known 
to disrupt rehearsal and conditions which disrupt the 
amount of attention which can be given to a task. In fact, 
rehearsal of material is sometimes equated to the attention 
one pays to the material. Anything which interferes with 
that attention also interferes with rehearsal. The same 
variables, types of tasks, and theories which one applies 
to attention appear to be relevant to rehearsal as well 
(1969a, p. 69).
Norman’s argument equating attention with rehearsal suggests 
that the attentional aspects of anxiety (narrow focus and alternation) 
would affect short-term memory processing.
Tobias (1977) has developed an information-processing model to 
clarify the relationship between anxiety and stages of cognitive 
processing. He noted that "Anxiety does not generally affect instructional 
outcomes directly. Instead, anxiety affects the cognitive processes 
required by the instructional methods, and these, in turn, affect out­
comes indirectly...anxiety may affect output in three ways...prior to 
processing, during processing, and after processing has been completed" 
(1977, p. 225). The focus of the current study is the effect of
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anxiety during processing; after input has been registered and during 
time when the individual is rehearsing the input to maintain its 
stability.
The Interference Hypothesis
When anxious subjects are asked to verbalize their thoughts, a 
significant quantity of self-deprecatory, worried thoughts emerge 
(I. Sarason, 1960, 1972; Wine, 1971). The alternation hypothesis 
posits that such thoughts are evoked on a sub-verbal level when the 
anxious person is engaged in task performance. These thoughts 
need not be conceptualized as silent vocalization. Vygotsky, in his 
classic analysis of the relationship between language and thought 
concluded that "Inner speech is not the interior aspect of external 
speech —  it is a function in itself. It still remains speech, i.e., 
thought connected with words ... [But] ... it is a dynamic shifting 
unstable thing", (1934, p. 149).
Although inner speech is silent, it can be quite compelling. 
According to Neisser "... attention can be withdrawn from every 
external channel and focused on the subject's own train of thought ... 
inner speech is necessarily attention-compelling ... [external] 
input ... remains 'unheard' like the irrelevant message in a shadow­
ing experiment". (1967, pp. 214-215).
The hypothesis investigated in the current study was that anxiety, 
because of its influence on focal attention, would reduce the effect­
iveness of the individual's short-term memory processing. The inter­
ference is hypothesized because task data in short-term memory would 
not be rehearsed during periods of inward attentional focus. Personal­
ized thoughts would compete with task relevant data for processing 
capacity and attention paid to inner speech would dominate over other 
input channels causing the premature decay of task-relevant information. 
Furthermore, the intrusion of personalized thoughts would conflict 
with the increased attentional focalization characteristic of high 
levels of arousal.
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Interference from a Rejected Channel
Fundamental to the interference hypothesis being advanced, is the 
assumption that stimuli from a rejected channel contact memory. If 
this were not the case, an anxious person might filter-out the task- 
irrelevant thoughts before they affected memory processing. However, 
research evidence suggests that irrelevant stimuli do contact memory.
Lewis (1970) demonstrated that an ignored message in a shadowing 
task reaches memory. Using dichotic presentation techniques, Lewis 
found that shadowing performance degrades when a synonym to a shadowed 
word is presented on the rejected ear. In order for shadowing 
latency to have increased, both the relevant and irrelevant word 
must have been processed and the semantic equivalence noted. Kahneman 
(1973) noted that under some circumstances, the rejected message will 
trigger an orienting response and will thus impinge upon consciousness.
The well-known Stroop phenomenon provides additional support for 
the idea that irrelevant information reaches memory. Stroop (1935) 
devised an interference task in which the subject is required to name 
the colors in which a set of words is printed. The words, however, 
are color words which do not correspond to the color of the ink used. 
For example, the subject might see the word red printed in green ink. 
The correct response would be "green”. Since subjects have a great 
deal of difficulty in filtering out the irrelevant information, the 
semantic content of the word must be decoded prior to rejection.
Keele (1972) investigated the Stroop phenomenon using tachistiscopic 
presentation of the color words. Colors of ink were associated with 
response keys and reaction time latencies were noted. Key presses 
were used in preference to verbal responses in order to determine if 
response competition rather than output interference is the delaying 
factor. Using a repeated measures design, Keele found that reaction 
time was significantly increased when subjects were responding to 
color words. No differences were obtained when non-semantic forms, 
scrambled color words, or non-color words were used.
It has been pointed out that memory for a rejected message in a 
dichotic shadowing task is minimal. Cherry (1953) reported that 
subjects were not aware when a message presented to the rejected ear 
switched from English to German. Moray (1959) has shown that even
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with multiple presentations of words to the rejected ear, subjects do 
not retain them. However, Norman (1969b) using a dichotic shadowing 
technique interrupted subjects and tested them for memory of the items 
which had been presented immediatelv prior to the interruption.
Norman found that the subjects exhibited temporary memory for the 
rejected message although there was no long term storage of it.
Norman (1969a) has called this the "what-did-you-say" phenomenon.
When a person is not attending to a question, the first reaction is to 
ask "what did you say?" But, before the question is repeated, the 
listener retrives it from memory.
Thus, there is considerable evidence to support the notion that 
information on a rejected channel is not simply filtered-out but reaches 
memory. In general, focal attention is deployed so as to minimize the 
amount of processing capacity allocated to a rejected message. If the 
allocated capacity is insufficient to deal with the rejected message, 
an orienting reflex occurs forcing attentional redeployment.
The Effect of Rehearsal Disruption on Short-Term Memory
An implicit assumption of the current hypothesis is that the 
self-deprecatory thoughts of high anxious persons are sufficiently 
similar to the inner speech used for rehearsal (Brown, 1958) to 
compete with it and hence allow premature decay of relevant information 
in short-term memory. If primary memory had an unlimited capacity for 
rehearsal, the irrelevant thoughts would not pose a problem. It is 
therefore necessary to show that the division of attention between two 
tasks will tend to reduce the amount of data which can be held in 
short-term memory.
Murdock (1965) hypothesized that if short-term memory operated in 
accordance with a limited capacity mechanism, a subsidiary task should 
decrease retention. A study by Broadbent and Heron (1962) had revealed 
that performance on a primary task varied with memory load on a sub­
sidiary task; Murdock's (1965) study was intended as a further test of 
the limited capacity hypothesis. Murdock performed two experiments to 
test the hypothesis.
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In the first experiment, subjects were presented with 20 two- 
syllable words at a rate of one word/second. Subjects were able to 
recall 7.4 words on the average in a free recall task. A subsidiary 
task was then introduced in which subjects were required to sort a 
deck of cards according to one of three rules. In the plain condition 
subjects merely dealt out cards; in the color condition subjects sorted 
the cards into red and black; while in the suit condition subjects 
sorted the cards into their respective suits.
Although in the absence of the subsidiary task, the subjects had 
been able to recall 7.4 words, free recall dropped to 5.82 words, 4.65 
words, and 4.35 words in the plain, color, and suit conditions 
respectively. Thus, Murdock's results indicate that the difficulty of 
a subsidiary task inversely affects free recall.
In the second experiment, Murdock instructed the subjects to con­
centrate on the card sorting or free recall tasks. As predicted, 
directing the subject's attention to one of the tasks improved performance 
on the attended-to task at the expense of the other. Murdock's explana­
tion of these results is compatible with the current hypothesis: "One
possibility is ... that the subsidiary task prevents rehearsal ...
[which] is necessary to prevent decay. The more demanding the sub­
sidiary task or the more attention given it, the more effectively is 
rehearsal prevented", (1965, p. 418).
Broadbent and Heron (1962) used an ingenious technique to 
distinguish between data which decayed while in primary memory and data 
which failed to reach primary memory. Subjects were presented with 
sheets of paper on which a series of random digits were printed. A 
cardboard overlay with a window prevented the subject from seeing more 
than one digit at a time. Subjects were required to respond to every 
occurrence of a target digit. For example, the subject might be asked 
to cross out every "2" encountered. A new target digit might 
be embedded in the list and was indicated by a circle. When a circled 
digit was encountered, the subject was to begin searching for an 
occurrence of the new target. For example, the subject might be cross­
ing out every 2 but upon encountering a 6 was instructed to begin
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crossing out every occurrence of a 6. Because of the slot in the over­
lay, the subjects could not refresh their memory with regard to the 
current digit.
Broadbent and Heron found that in some instances, a subject 
would make some correct responses after encountering a circled digit 
but later had entered a series of errors. These errors could not 
result from the subject's having failed to note the circled digits 
(else there would not have been the initial correct responses) but 
from having forgotten which digit to check for. The incidence of these 
errors was significantly increased by distraction. The major findings 
were that: (1) no significant difference in speed was observed in a
no-memory task without distraction; (2) the type of error ("circle 
forgotten") described above was significantly increased by distraction; 
(3) distraction slowed performance on the short-term memory task. 
According to the authors, "search for a signal when the subject has to 
remember which signal is required is likely to be affected by a dis­
traction task ... continuous tasks which involve even a slight load on 
memory are very vulnerable to distraction when compared with similar 
tasks which avoid this load ... results emphasize the importance of 
rehearsal as a possible means of combatting interference" (Broadbent 
and Heron, 1962).
Posner and Rossman described a series of experiments which are 
consistent with the idea that "retention in short-term memory is an 
active process which is extremely liable to disruption" (1965, p. 503). 
Posner and Rossman noted that although rehearsal requires a portion of 
central capacity and that a task which demands the attention of the 
subject is said to 'prevent rehearsal', the degree to which attentional 
demands block rehearsal varies with the nature of the task. They 
concluded that individuals have "a limited capacity for information 
processing. The rehearsal process requires a part of this capacity 
and can co-exist to a greater degree with tasks which require a small 
amount of this capacity than with those requiring a larger amount" 
(1965, p. 504).
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Previous Research Relating Anxiety to Short-Term Memory
A number of investigators have investigated aspects of the relation­
ship between anxiety arousal and short-term memory processes. Sieber, 
Kameya, and Paulson (1970) studied memory errors and performance errors 
in children as a function of test anxiety level and memory support, in 
a puzzle and a concept-formation task. They found that anxiety inter­
fered with short-term memory, and memory support reduced the performance 
differences between high and low anxious children.
Sandison and Burgess (1971) failed to find differences between 
high and low anxious individuals in retention of lists of 16 single 
digits. The digits were presented aurally and the probe digit technique 
used to measure short-term retention. However, very few subjects 
participated in the experiment (N=18) and these were selected on the 
basis of extreme scores on the Achievement Anxiety Test (Alpert and 
Haber, 1960). No stress induction procedure was employed so it is not 
clear to what extent the high anxiety group was actually experiencing 
anxiety.
Borkowski and Mann (1968) selected high anxious and low anxious 
students on the basis of the MAS. Presenting lists of CCCC's which 
were designed to produce inter-item interference, they fould that low 
anxious students performed somewhat better than high anxious students 
overall. Zubrzycki and Borkowski (1973) suggested that the effect of 
anxiety on short-term memory might be localized to the trace formation 
stage of short-term memory rather than in the process of retrieval.
Performance on the Digit Span subtest of the Wechsler Intelligence 
Scale has been assumed to reflect anxiety as well as intelligence 
(Walker and Spence, 1964). Moldawsky and Moldawsky (1952) reported a 
significant relationship between experimentally induced anxiety and 
Digit Span performance. Calvin, Koons, Bingham and Fink (1955) found 
significant relationships between scores on the Manifest Anxiety Scale 
and Digit Span performance; Walker and Spence (1964) found significant 
correlations between Digit Span and both MAS and TAQ scores. Hodges 
and Spielberger (1969) found that state anxiety (measured by the
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Zuckerman Adjective Check List) was related to Digit Span performance 
but failed to find a relationship with MAS score.
Leherissy, O'Neil, Heinrich and Hansen (1971) investigated the 
effects of memory support on learning in a computer-assisted instruction 
task. The instructional task consisted of a difficult tutorial lesson 
on the field properties of complex numbers. Students in the memory 
support condition were provided with a list of their previous errors 
while students in the control condition were not given memory support. 
High-anxious students given memory support made significantly fewer 
errors than did high-anxious students without memory support. Memory 
support did not improve the performance of low and medium anxious 
students. Overall, high-anxious students made more errors than their 
low- and medium-anxious peers.
Deffenbacher (1978) tested the attentional alternation theory 
using performance on an anagrams task under conditions of high and 
low-stress. Subjects were divided into high-anxious and low- 
anxious groups on the basis of TAS score (high-anxious >20, low- 
anxious <12). High-anxious individuals in the high-stress condition 
solved significantly fewer anagrams than high-anxious individuals in 
the low-stress condition ( x ■ 3.29 vs. x = 5.65). High-anxious 
individuals indicated that they were more distracted by anxiety-related 
interference than low-anxious individuals with the greatest interference 
occurring in the high-anxiety-high-stress group. Although both worry 
and emotionality scores were related to interference, worry appeared a 
more important factor than emotionality.
Current Study
The current study investigated the hypothesis that anxiety would 
impair short-term memory performance. It differed from preceeding 
studies in the following ways:
1. Both a neutral (low stress) and a testlike (high stress) 
condition were incorporated into the experimental design.
2. Both trait anxiety and state anxiety measures 
were employed.
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3. Two control (meaningful string) trials were included 
to make certain that all subjects were attentionally 
focusing on the to-be-remembered stimuli.
4. An interpolated-distractor-task paradigm was used to 
contra! rehearsal.
The specific hypotheses investigated by the current study are:
1. When presented with to-be-recalled strings consisting 
of seven consonants followed by an interpolated 
arithmetic task, high anxious individuals will recall 
fewer letters than low anxious individuals.
2. The effect of anxiety on recall will be greater
in a test-like (high-stress) condition than in a 
non-test-like (low-stress) condition.
3. Individuals in the high-stress condition will recall 
fewer letters than those in the low-stress condition.
4. The effects due to anxiety will be more related to 
state (situational) than trait anxiety.
5. There will be no differences in the recall of meaning­




The main investigation was conducted to test the hypothesis that 
anxiety would interfere with short-term memory rehearsal.
Subj ects
The subjects for the main experiment consisted of 179 under­
graduates from Trenton State College. They were recruited from classes 
within the Psychology Department and were either paid $2.00 or offered 
class credit for their participation. No student, present on the day 
of the experiment, elected not to participate. Twenty-nine protocols 
had to be discarded because students either failed to complete them 
during the experiment or it was obvious that the student had not under­
stood the instructions. Complete protocols were therefore available for 
150 subjects.* Thirty-eight of these subjects were male and 112 were 
female. The ages of the subjects ranged from 19 to 54; the mean age was 
23 years.
Experimental Groups
Subjects were run in seven groups. Each group was randomly 
assigned to one of two stress-level conditions: a high-stress condition
(N=87) or a low-stress condition (N=63). Subjects in the high-stress 
condition were led to believe that they were taking an experimental 
version of a newly developed intelligence test and were asked to perform 
an initial task that was extremely difficult. Subjects in the low-stress 
condition were asked to help out in an "educational experiment," and 
were asked to perform a simple initial task. The purpose of the two 
conditions was to compare the subjects' behavior under test-like (high
Due to a coding error, one subject was excluded from some analyses: 
therefore, in some cases N=149.
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aroused-anxiety) and non-test-like (low aroused-anxiety) conditions.
The experimental tasks for both groups were identical. Details of the 
stress induction procedures are given below.
Experimental Task
The basic task employed in this study was structurally similar to 
commonly employed "distractor" paradigms for recall in short-term memory. 
Subjects were shown a to-be-recalled stimulus, performed an interpolated 
task, and, on presentation of a cue, were asked to write down the to-be- 
recalled stimulus.
The to-be-recalled stimuli consisted of seven-letter strings. The 
choice of string length was based on Miller's (1956) hypothesis that 
seven units of information is the average retention capacity of adult 
short-term memory, and on the results of a pilot study.
Without rehearsal, data in short-term memory decays completely with­
in 30-40 seconds (Norman, 1969a). Thus, stimulus recall after 40 seconds 
indicates that rehearsal has been employed; increases in rehearsal 
produce increases in retention (Murdock, 1965). The task interpolated 
between string presentation and recall served two functions:
1. To delay the recall attempt for at least 40 seconds.
2. To limit the amount of rehearsal that the subject could 
devote to the to-be-recalled string. This was intended
to accentuate differences in recall as a function of rehearsal.
It was decided that the interpolated task should involve arithmetic 
manipulation and should be sufficiently attention-compelling to effect 
a 50% loss in recall under low stress conditions. Various tasks were 
investigated in a series of pilot studies which are described in 
Appendix A.
The interpolated task consisted of a series of arithmetic problems 
of the form 3 + 5 +  13 + 4 =  | | which the subjects were to compute
mentally. Each problem was displayed for five seconds, followed by a 
two second blank display during which students were to write down their 
answer. Following the series of arithmetic problems, a question mark (?) 
was displayed. The question mark served as a recall cue; on presenta­
tion of the question mark, subjects were to write down as many letters
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of the to-be-recalled string as they could recall. Depending upon the 
trial, the interpolated task consisted of either six (trials 1-4) or 
eight (trials 5-8) arithmetic problems. However, subjects did not know 
how many problems would be interpolated between presentation and recall 
and could not anticipate when the recall symbol (?) would appear.
Figure 4, illustrates the structure of the basic task.
Meaningful and Arbitrary Strings
The to-be-recalled strings employed were of two types: arbitrary
and meaningful. The arbitrary strings consisted of seven distinct 
consonants. As there are 21 consonants (counting "y") in the alphabet, 
it was possible to construct three strings of seven consonants, using 
each consonant once. Two sets of strings were assembled; thus, there 
were a total of six arbitrary strings with each consonant appearing 
once in two strings. The six strings were assembled by two judges who 
agreed that the final letter sequences had minimal associative value; 
this was important since "chunkable" strings would provide less of a 
short-term memory load than strings of low associative value and would 
result in some strings being easier to rehearse than others.
In addition to the six arbitrary strings, two meaningful strings 
were employed. Like the arbitrary strings, the meaningful strings 
consisted of seven letters each, with no letter occurring more than 
once in a given string. Unlike the arbitrary strings, however, the 
meaningful strings included vowels and formed a common seven-letter 
word. As the meaningful strings could be coded as a single unit of 
information, they imposed a smaller short-term memory load than the 
arbitrary strings.
Trials
The experimental task consisted of eight replications of the basic 
task using different strings and arithmetic problems. Six of the trials 
used arbitrary strings while two trials used meaningful strings. The 
eight trials were divided into two groups of four; between trials four 
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Figure 4. Structure of the Basic Task.
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Each group of four trials consisted of three arbitrary strings 
followed by a meaningful string. The meaningful string was placed at 
the end of the blocks because it was felt that any other position would 
compromise the maintenance of stress level. Table 1 shows the eight 
strings used in the experiment. The order shown in this table was the 
order generally used; however, some subjects received the blocks in 
inverted order (5.6,7,8,1,2,3,4) to permit analysis of possible order 
effects.
As mentioned above, there were six arithmetic interpolated 
problems for trials 5-8. This was done for two reasons:
1. Varying the number of interpolated problems prevented the
subjects from knowing exactly when the recall cue (?) would
appear. If the subjects knew how many problems would be
interpolated, some anxious subjects might have attempted to 
"beat" the experiment by writing the to-be-recalled stimulus 
on the appropriate line, when it was first presented.
2. The pilot studies suggested that stress levels tended to 
decrease over time as the students became accustomed to the 
task. The use of eight interpolated problems made the second 
four trials slightly more difficult than the first four and 
helped maintain the stress level.
Procedure^
During the class period prior to the experiment, the true-false 
form of the Test Anxiety Scale (I. Sarason, 1972) was administered.
Students were not made aware of the relationship between the TAS 
and the impending experiment.
On the day of the experiment, students were invited to participate 
in the study. All students present agreed to participate. The students 
were then asked to complete the State Worry-Emotionality Scale (WEI) and 
indicate their expectancy of success (EX1). These measures of state 
(aroused) anxiety are discussed in the next section.
The students were then asked to assemble in the room where the
experiment was to take place. When all students were seated, the
^The instructions used in the experiment will be found in Appendix B.
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Table 1




1 GBNQWRF arbitrary 6
2 YTCXDVK arbitrary 6
3 ' JSLHMZP arbitrary 6
4 KITCHEN meaningful 6
5 YGBFSJT arbitrary 8
6 HCXNQKL arbitrary 8
7 RVZMDWP arbitrary 8
8 TADPOLE meaningful 8
Approximately 25% of the subjects were presented with the strings 
in the order: 5, 6, 7, 8, 1, 2, 3, 4.
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experimental protocols were handed out.
If the group was in the low-stress condition, the stack of booklets 
was given to the first student of each row and passed back. The 
booklets were not sealed and had a simple typed cover (see Appendix C 
for sample).
In the high-stress condition, booklets were individually handed out 
by a "proctor." The booklets had printed covers which identified them 
as "experimental editions" of the "National Intelligence Test." Each 
booklet was sealed and printed on the cover was an admonition not to 
break the seal until told to do so (see Appendix C for sample). The 
booklets were plastic wrapped in bundles of ten, and the "proctor" 
ostentatiously unwrapped them as needed.
When all students had received their booklets, they were asked to 
perform an initial task. This task was not scored; its purpose was to 
manipulate the students' anxiety level by creating an initial failure 
experience (for the high-stress condition) or a mild success experience 
(for the low-stress condition).
Like the short-term memory tasks used in the recall trials, the 
initial task required recall of letter strings. It consisted of a 
series of ten strings which were presented one at a time. Each string 
was projected for two seconds; this was followed by an eight-second 
interval during which students were to recall the string from memory.
Although the procedural instructions and examples were the same for 
the high-stress and low-stress conditions, the strings displayed were 
different. Subjects in the low-stress condition were shown four-letter 
strings, such as "PZNF," which were easily memorized. Subjects in the 
high-stress group were shown ten-letter consonant strings which exceeded 
their short-term memory span. As these strings were not readily 
"chunkable," everyone in the high-stress condition performed imperfectly. 
Thus, the low-stressed subjects had a moderate success experience while 
the high-stressed subjects had a failure experience.
Following completion of the stress induction (or low-stress 
control task), the students were asked to fill out the second worry- 





Distribute neutral protocolsDistribute National Intelligence Test
Administer Test Anxiety Scale
Administer Initial neutral task
Administer State Anxiety Scales (WEI, EX1)
Administer initial failure task
Administer State Anxiety Scales (WE2, EX2)
Administer State Anxiety Scales (WE3, EX3)
Administer State Anxiety Scales (WE4, EX4)
TRIALS 5 -
TRIALS 1 -
Figure 5. Experimental Procedure
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Experimental Trials
Following administration of the initial task, the short-term 
recall trials were administered. State anxiety measures were 
administered following trials four and eight. Figure 5 presents the 
sequence of the procedures followed.
When the last state anxiety measure was completed, the subjects' 
booklets were collected. Subjects in the stress condition were 
"debriefed" to remove any residual stress and all subjects were given 
an explanation of the experimental hypotheses and design; they were 
requested not to discuss the experiment with future participants.
Anxiety Measures
Three measures of anxiety were used in the experiment. The 
Test Anxiety Scale (I. Sarason, 1972) is a commonly used measure of 
"trait" anxiety or anxiety-proneness in an academic testing situation. 
The State Worry-Emotionality Scale (Richardson, O'Neil, and Grant, 1977) 
is a measure of aroused anxiety (situational anxiety) developed for 
experimental situations. In addition, students were asked to rate their 
expectancy of success (on a scale of 0-10) four times during the course 
of the experiment. This simple measure has been shown to be related to 
worry (Morris and Liebert, 1970).
TAS. The Text Anxiety Scale (TAS) is a 37-item true-false measure 
of tendency toward test anxiety (I. Sarason, 1972). Scores on the TAS 
range from a low of 0 to a high of 37 with higher scores indicating 
relatively more anxiety-proneness. The TAS was developed from the 
original Test Anxiety Questionnaire (TAQ) but avoids the cumbersome 
and unnecessary "length in centimeters" scoring used in the original 
TAQ (Levitt, 1967).
Because the TAS is a measure of trait anxiety, it was administered 
prior to the experiment. To minimize possible student unease about 
self-disclosure, the TAS was presented as a scale of attitudes to 
testing rather than as a measure of anxiety. The items were represented
68
as statements regarding examinations which other students had made; 
students were asked to endorse those which were representative of 
their own feelings. The TAS along with the instructions used to 
administer it may be found in Appendix D.
State Worry/Emotionality. The State Worry/Emotionality Scale 
is a 10-item scale designed to measure state anxiety in a testing 
situation. Scores range from a low of 10 to a high of 50. The 
score may be partitioned into two components: a worry component rang­
ing from 5 to 25, and an emotionality component which also ranges 
from 5 to 25 (Liebert and Morris, 1967). As shown in Figure 5, the 
worry/emotionality scale was administered at four points during the 
experiment: pretreatment (stress induction), postreatment, following
the fourth trial (midpoint of experiment), and following the eighth 
trial (end of experiment). These scores are designated WEI, WE2, WE3, 
and WE4 respectively. When component scores are reported, they are 
designated similarly; thus, WEI * W1 + El. Two subjects failed to 
complete the WE4 scale. For purposes of data analysis, the sum of 
the two state anxiety measures administered during the course of the 
experiment, WE2 + WE3 was computed. This score reflects the state 
anxiety aroused during the experiment and is referred to as WE23; its 
theoretical range is from a low of 20 to a high of 100.
An alternative measure of state anxiety aroused during the 
experiment could have included WE4 (i.e., WE234 = WE2 + WE3 + WE4). 
This measure was not used because it was not clear if the anxiety 
reported at the end of the experiment (WE4) was due entirely to the 
task itself or if it was confounded by the subjects' retrospective 
evaluation of their performance. Because of this uncertainty, WE23 
appeared to be a more "pure" measure of state anxiety aroused during 
the experiment.
Expectancy. As a measure of belief as to how well they were 
performing, students evaluated their expectancy of success at four 
points during the experiment (immediately after each administration of 
the worry/emotionality scale). The expectancies were rated on a scale 
of 0 (certain to fail) to 10 (certain to succeed). Expectancy scores 
are designated: EX1, EX2, EX3, and EX4.
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Table 2
Intercorrelations Among Anxiety Scores 
for the Total Sample (N~150)
TAS WEI WE2 WE 3 WE4 aEX1 EX2 EX3 EX4
TAS 1.00 .38 .36 .44 .41 - .46 -.27 -.39 -.28
WEI 1.00 .55 .52 .51 -.42 -. 20:< -.41 -.34
WE 2 1.00 .76 .73 -.29 -.56 -.46 -.41
WE 3 1.00 .92 -.35 -.40 -.58 -.52
WE 4 1.00 -.35 -.42 -.59 -.56
EX1 1.00 .42 .52 .35




Significant at .05. All other correlations are significant at £< .01.
Note that expectancy scores are in the reverse direction from the other two 





This chapter presents the results of the study. The first 
section describes the levels of anxiety reported over the course of 
the study. The second section presents analyses of the relation­
ship between anxiety level and performance on the short-term memory 
task. The third section presents analyses of the relationship between 
anxiety level and performance on the interpolated arithmetic task.
Reported Anxiety 
Observed scores on the TAS ranged from a low of 2 to a high of 
36; the mean score was 18.5 with a standard deviation of 7.8. Since 
the assignment of students to the high and low-stress conditions was 
random, the mean TAS score of the two groups would not be expected 
to differ (t(148)<l, n.s.).
The observed range of the state anxiety score WE23 was from 20 
to 83. The mean WE23 score for the high-stress condition was 37.4 
(s.d. = 15.2); for the low-stress condition the mean score was 29.3 
(s.d. = 9.5).
Correlations Among Measures of Anxiety
Table 2 shows the intercorrelations among the various measures 
of anxiety for the total group. The TAS correlates moderately with 
the state measures of anxiety. The TAS was most highly correlated 
with the students’ initial expectancy of success (EX1). The high 
correlation between TAS and EX1 was found for the high-stress 
(r = -.40) and low-stress (r = -.55) groups as well as the total group. 
Thus, the TAS tended to best predict the subjects' belief about how 
well they would do when their judgments were made prior to their 
learning about the task. However, as task data became available 
(EX2, EX3, EX4), the relationship was somewhat reduced.
71
The WE scales were moderately Intercorrelated. However, the 
correlations were sufficiently low to indicate that subjects were 
responding based on their state anxiety rather than consistently 
repeating the same responses. Each WE score was most highly correlated 
with the WE score immediately following; thus, WEI correlated highest 
with WE2, WE2 with WE3, and WE3 with WE4. The correlations became 
increasingly greater for each pair indicating an increasing stability 
of responding.
State Anxiety Over Time
While the TAS score, as a measure of anxiety-proneness, would be 
expected to remain reasonably stable over time, the WE scores, as 
measures of state anxiety, were expected to fluctuate over time. 
Similarly, the students' expectancy of success was expected to vary 
over time, generally declining as the subjects' worry increased.
Table 3 presents the means and standard deviations of the state 
anxiety measures over the course of the experiment. The worry and 
emotionality components of the WE scales are presented separately 
and as combined scores.
From a theoretical point of view worry has been shown to be a 
more important factor in terms of performance than emotionality 
(Deffenbacher, 1978; Morris and Liebert, 1970). However, the patterns 
of results obtained with emotionality tend to be the same as those 
obtained with worry but be somewhat weaker. Because the correlations 
between the worry and emotionality scores were quite high, it was 
decided to use the combined worry-emotionality scores in the analyses 
that follow. Data on the component scores will be found in Appendix C.
The state anxiety scores at time 1 were measured prior to the start 
were generally quite high; and the combined score was more highly 
correlated with the dependent variables than the component scores.
The state anxiety scores at time 1 were measured prior to the start 
of the experiment. These may be considered base or control scores 
as they reflected the students' reported level of anxiety prior to 
their experiencing anxiety resulting from the experimental manipula­
tion (stress induction) or from the experimental task itself.
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Table 3
Means and SD for State Anxiety Measures
Anxiety
Measure4
High-Stress (N“87) Low-Stress (N=*62)
Mean SD Mean SD
Worry 1 6.89 2.15 6.84 2.40
Worry 2 9.98 3.90 6.52 2.19
Worry 3 9.87 4.25 8.79 3.76
Worry 4 9.49 4.58 8.40 3.95
Emotionality 1 6.45 2.29 6.30 2.11
Emotionality 2 8.58 4.08 6.31 1.96
Emotionality 3 8.94 4.45 7.74 3.54
Emotionality 4 8.62 4.48 7 .18 3.73
W/Eb 1 13.33 4.20 13.15 4.35
W/E 2 18.55 7.45 12.82 3.86
W/E 3 18.82 8.34 16.53 6.99





















a The numbers following the measure name refer to the time at which 
the measure was administered. 1 * before stress induction, 2 = 
after stress induction, 3 * after 4th trial, 4 ■ after 8th trial.
b The W/E score is the sum of the respective worry and emotionality 
scores, e.g. W/E 1 ■ worry 1 + emotionality 1.
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The state anxiety scores at time 2 were measured following the 
stress induction (high-stress condition) or control (low-stress 
condition) task. As expected, state anxiety increased for the high- 
stress subjects and their expectancy of success declined. For the 
low-stress subjects, state anxiety levels remained approximately the 
same (or declined slightly) following the control task which paralleled 
the stress-induction task. The expectancy of success of the low-stress 
subjects increased. Only 9.7% of the low-stress subjects rated their 
expectancy of success 5 or less; the lowest rating (1 subject) was 3.
In contrast, 52.9% of the high-stress subjects rated their expectancy 
of success as 5 or less; half of these ratings were 3 or less.
The variance of anxiety scores increased for the high-stress 
groups following the stress-induction procedure (partly as a result 
of a few students reporting very high stress levels) while the variance 
of scores decreased for the low-stress group from time 1 to time 2.
The third set of state anxiety scores were obtained following the 
fourth trial. These scores were influenced by the stress associated 
with the task. The state anxiety of the high-stress group remained 
at approximately the same level as time 2 while the scores of the low- 
stress group increased sharply. Apparently, this increase resulted 
from the stress of the experimental task itself; this is supported by 
the fact that the expectancies of the low-stress group dropped two 
points following exposure to the task.
The fourth set of state anxiety scores were obtained following 
completion of the eighth trial. The WE scores of the high-stress group 
remained about the same while the corresponding scores of the low- 
stress group dropped one point.
It is possible that the state anxiety scores measured at times 
3 and 4 are somewhat depressed. This effect may have occurred for 
two reasons. First, the trials ending each block (trial 4 and trial 8) 
used meaningful strings and were therefore easier than the preceeding 
three trials. Second, the interval during which the students completed 
the anxiety scales was in itself less stressful than the fast-paced 
experimental task. Accordingly, the anxiety scores reported at times
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3 and 4 are probably somewhat conservative. Figure 6 is a graph of the 
mean state WE scores for the high and the low-stress groups and 
Figure 7 depicts the mean expectancy scores of the two groups over time.
In order to assess the significance of the differences among the 
state anxiety indices, a series of ANOVAs were performed. Table 4 
summarizes the results of an analysis of variance for the dependent 
variable worry-emotionallty as a function of stress level (high vs. 
low) and time (WEI, WE2, WE3, WE4). As can be seen in the table, 
there was a significant main effect for both stress-level and time 
and a significant interaction. Post-hoc repeated measures t̂ -tests 
were performed in order to locate the differences underlying the 
interaction. As predicted, the state anxiety of the high-stress group 
increased following stress induction (t_(86) * 8.03, p<.001). The state 
anxiety of the low-stress group increased following exposure to the 
experimental task (t_(61) = 6.49 , p<.001) but never reached the level 
reported by the high-stress group.
Table 5 reports an analysis of variance for the dependent variable, 
expectancy as a function of stress-level and time. Again, there was a 
significant main effect for both stress-level and time and a significant 
interaction. The expectancies of the high stress group declined, 
predictably, following exposure to the failure task (_t(86) = 8.00, 
pc.001). The expectancy of success for the low-stress group declined 
following their exposure to the experimental task (t/61) = 22.00, pc.001). 
Anxiety and Performance
The subsequent sections of this chapter report the results on the 
effects of anxiety on performance. Two types of performance variables 
will be considered: letters recalled correctly and performance on the
interpolated arithmetic task. Table 6 shows the correlations of the 
three measures of anxiety with three performance variables: total
letters recalled on arbitrary strings (LC123567), total arithmetic 
problems answered correctly on arbitrary trials (AC123567), and total 
arithmetic problems omitted on arbitrary trials (A0123567).
It is interesting to note that the direction of the correlations 
are consistently the same for both the high and low-stress groups; 
however, the correlations for the low-stress group are generally 





















Figure 6. Mean state anxiety for high-stress and low-stress 
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EXPECTANCY ADMINISTRATION
Figure 7. Mean expectancy of success for high-stress and low-stress 
conditions at four points during the experiment.
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Table 4
Analysis of Variance Table for Worry/Emotionality
Source df M.S. F £ % Total SS
Condition (Stress/Nonstress) 1 1045.27 7.53 <•007 3.44
Subjects 147 138.78
Time 3 539.93 35.25 <.001 5.33
Condition x Time 3 189.16 12.35 <.001 1.87
Time x Subject 441 15.32
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Table 5
Analysis of Variance Table for Expectancy of Success
Source df M.S. F_ £ % Total SS
Condition (Stress/Nonstress) 1 93.61 6.81 <.01 2.57
Subjects 147 13.74
Time (1-4) 3 111.90 47.09 <.001 9.22
Condition x Time 3 47.40 19.94 <.001 3.91
Time x Subject 441 2.38
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exceptions to this are in the correlations of expectancy of success 
with performance, some of which were not significant.
TAS, was not significantly correlated with recall for either group. 
However, TAS was significantly correlated with arithmetic problems 
correct, and arithmetic problems omitted for the low-stress group.
Although worry/emotionality was significantly correlated with recall 
for the low-stress group, only the fourth state anxiety measure (W4,
E4, WE4) was significantly related to recall for the high-stress group.
In the case of arithmetic performance, worry/emotionality was significant­
ly correlated with arithmetic problems correct and arithmetic problems 
omitted with the exception of the correlation of WE3 with arithmetic 
problems omitted by the high-stress group.
Analyses of Letters Recalled
The major hypothesis investigated in this study was that high- 
anxious subjects would recall fewer letters than low-anxious subjects.
This section presents analyses of letters recalled as a function of 
anxiety score.
Figure 8 shows the mean letters recalled by the low and high- 
stress groups for each of the eight trials. This figure shows that, 
as expected, the high stressed subjects recalled fewer letters than 
their low-stressed counterparts in the trials in which arbitrary 
strings were used (1, 2, 3, 5, 6). The only exception to this pattern 
was in trial seven. No order effects were found (t<l, n.s.).
Trials four and eight used meaningful strings which did not 
require rehearsal. Accordingly, it was predicted that the two groups 
would perform equally well on these trials and, in fact, both groups 
achieved essentially error-free performance. On trial 4, the high- 
stress group recalled an average of 6.86 letters; the low-stress group 
recalled 7.00 letters. On trial 8, the high-stress group recalled 
6.94 letters, while the low-stress group recalled an average of 6.89 
letters. No partial recall was exhibited on the meaningful trials; 
the only errors were subjects who omitted the entire string.
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Table 6
Correlations of Anxiety Measures with 












HIGH STRESS LOW STRESS
TAS -.06 -.15 -.23* -.30** .15 .32**
W 1 -.03 -.28* -.27* -.50** .18 .37**
W 2 -.08 -.24* -.23* -.47** .14 .31**
W 3 -.16 -.24* -.42** -.55** .32** .46**
W 4 -.24* -.32** -.46** -.51** .36** .44**
E 1 .00 -.25* -.40** -.44** .28** .30**
E 2 -.09 -.36** -.26* -.63** .19 .51**
E 3 -.09 -.33** -.36** -.56** .21* .53**
E 4 -.28** -.37** -.38** -.58** .26* .50**
WE 1 -.02 -.28* -.36** -.49** .25* .34**
WE 2 -.09 -.32** -.26* -.58** .18 .44**
WE 3 -.13 -.30** -.41** -.58** .27* .52**
WE 4 -.22* -.35** -.44** -.56** .32** .48**
EX 1 .23* .10 .16 .32** -.13 -.20
EX 2 .12 .03 .19 .16 -.13 -.08
EX 3 .18 .36** .36** .49** -.30** -.28*
EX 4 .05 .40** .36** .48** -.30** -.37**
** p_< .01
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The relationships between the performance variables (letters
recalled, arithmetic problems answered correctly, and arithmetic
problems omitted) and the anxiety variables (TAS, state worry/
emotionality, and stress level) were analyzed using multiple linear
regression analysis. In the technique employed (Cohen, 1968), the
unique (independent) variance contributed by each variable was tested
for significance. Since the independent variables in a regression
analysis tend to be correlated (i.e., to have overlapping variance)
the interpretation of a multiple regression equation in which all
terms are evaluated simultaneously may be misleading. The technique
employed in the current analysis avoids this problem by successive
partialing of the independent variables.
The significance of the incremental contribution of independent
variable X. + 1 to the prediction of Y over the contributions of
2X^, X^, ..., X^ was tested. In particular, the increment to R due to 
the addition of X^ + 1 was tested by the F ratio:
2 2 (R y.x^ ... ,xi,xi+l - R y.x1,...,xi)
F = o
(1-R y.x1>..•xi,xi+l)/(n-i-2)
with df = 1 and n-i-2; this formula is a special case of Formula 7 
given by Cohen (1968, p. 435). A significant F value implies that
bi+i f °-
The analyses used in the experiment investigated the effects of 
anxiety and stress-level on the performance variables. The overall 
model used was
Y = bQ + bjA + b2S + b3 (A x S) + e
where:
A denotes score on the relevant anxiety questionnaire 
(either TAS or WE2 + WE3)
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S identifies the stress condition of the subject 
(l“high stress, -l*low stress)
A x S was the anxiety by stress interaction 
Three performance variables were used as dependent variables:
LC123567 - the total number of letters recalled on the arbitrary 
strings
AC123567 - the total number of arithmetic problems correct on 
arbitrary trials
A0123567 - the total number of arithmetic problems omitted during
arbitrary trials
2 2 The quadratic term, A , and the quadratic interaction term A x S
were also evaluated because some investigators have postulated a
cuvilinear relationship between anxiety and performance. The classic
inverted - U curve (known as the Yerkes - Dodson principle) relating
arousal level to learning, is appropriately described as a quadratic
function. However, the quadratic terms did not contribute significant
additional variance to Y in any of the models, nor did trend analysis
reveal significant departures from linearity. Accordingly, these terms
were excluded from the model.
The analyses were based upon the following four regression models:
(1) Y = bg + b^ (anxiety score) + e
(2) Y =* bg + b2 (stress level) + e
(3) Y = b^ + b^ (anxiety score) + b2 (stress level) + e
(4) Y = bg + bi (anxiety score) + b2 (stress level) + b^
(anxiety score x stress level) + e 
The unique contribution of the stress condition to the prediction 
of performance was evaluated by comparing model (3) with model (1) 
by use of the F-statistic described above. Similarly, the unique 
contribution of the anxiety score to the prediction of performance 
was evaluated by comparison of model (2) to model (3). Finally, the 
significance of the anxiety x stress interaction was evaluated by 
comparing model (3) with model (4).
The analyses are thus similar to analyses of covariance and are 
reported in terms of the significance of an effect for anxiety, a 
main effect for stress level, and an interaction (Cohen, 1968).
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TAS and Letters Recalled
The technique described above was employed to analyze the effects 
of test anxiety-proneness (TAS score) and stress condition (high-stress 
vs. low-stress) on total letters recalled in arbitrary trials (LC123567). 
Since stress level was a nominal variable, the subjects' "scores" were 
coded as +1 (high-stress) or -1 (low-stress). High-stress subjects 
recalled significantly fewer letters than the low-stress group. The 
subjects in the high-stress group correctly recalled an average of 16.4 
letters (s.d.*6.3), while subjects in the low-stress group correctly 
recalled an average of 39% of the stimulus letters while the high-stress 
group correctly recalled an average of 45% of the letters. The biserial 
correlation between stress level and letters recalled was .22.
Table 7 summarizes the results of the multiple regression analysis, 
predicting LC123567 from TAS and stress-level. TAS and stress-level.
TAS did not contribute significantly to the prediction of letters 
correct beyond stress condition although the sign of the coefficient 
suggested a relationship in the predicted (negative) direction.
The contribution of stress condition (beyond that of TAS) was 
significant; as reported above, subjects in the high-stress condition 
recalled fewer letters than their low-stress counterparts. The TAS x 
stress condition interaction did not contribute significant additional 
information beyond the combined contribution of TAS and stress-level 
to the prediction of letters recalled correctly.
The TAS is a measure of an individual's anxiety-proneness in 
testing situations. An individual who scores high on the TAS is more 
likely to experience anxiety in evaluative situations than one whose 
score is low. But TAS predicts little about a particular individual's 
anxiety responses to a given situation. Consequently, the relationship 
between an individual's TAS score and the actual level of anxiety 
experienced in a given situation may be small.
To the extent that an individual is able and willing to accurately 
report anxious thoughts and feelings, state anxiety measures more 
accurately reflect the anxiety felt by the individual in the experimental
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Table 7
Results of Multiple Linear Regression 
Analysis of the Effect of Anxiety (TAS) on 
Letters Recalled (Arbitrary Strings)
Source df F %Vara Regression*5Weight
TAS 1,147 1.63 1.06 -0.11
Stress 1,147 4.36* 2.84 -2.32
TAS x Stress 1,146 <1 0.34 0.06
Independent variance accounted for by effect 
k Constant = 19.60 
p < .05
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situation. It will be recalled that state anxiety was measured by the 
state worry/emotionality scale at four points during the experiment.
As noted previously, the state anxiety measures WE2 and WE3 were summed 
to create a measure of anxiety during the experiment.
WE23 and Letters Recalled
Table 8 summarizes the results of the multiple linear regression 
analyses testing the prediction of LC123567 from state anxiety (WE23) 
and stress-condition. The state anxiety score is the sum of the second 
worry/emotionality score (immediately following treatment) and the 
third WE score (following trial 4). Figure 9 shows the nature of the 
anxiety x stress interaction.
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Table 8
Results of Multiple Linear Regression 
Analysis of the Effect of Anxiety (WE23) 
on Letters Recalled (Arbitrary Strings)
Source df_ F % Vara
, b Regression
Weight
WE23 1,147 6.14* 3.8 -0.18
STRESS 1,147 2.33 1.4 -5.12
WE23 x STRESS 1,146 6.77* 4.1 0.14
Independent variance accounted for by effect
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Figure 9. State anxiety by stress-condition interaction for letters 
recalled.
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Analysis of Arithmetic Performance 
This section is concerned with performance on the interpolated 
arithmetic task. Arithmetic performance was measured by two scores: 
the number of arithmetic problems answered correctly (AC) and the 
number of arithmetic problems omitted (AO). Figure 10 shows the 
number of arithmetic problems answered correctly by the low-stress 
and the high-stress groups on each trial. Because trials 1-4 
employed six interpolated arithmetic problems and trials 5-8 employed 
eight interpolated problems, the number of problems answered correctly 
has been transformed to a proportion correct to simplify comparison 
across trials.
Examination of Figure 10 shows that subjects in the high-stress 
condition performed better than subjects in the low-stress condition 
on all trials. This performance is the reverse of that observed for 
letter recall where high-stress subjects performed worse than low- 
stress subjects.
Subjects in the high-stress condition correctly answered an 
average of 39.9 (71%) of the problems while subjects in the low- 
stress condition correctly answered an average of 37.9 (68%) of the 
problems; performance of the two groups were therefore quite similar.
TAS and Arithmetic Problems Correct
Table 9 summarizes the results of the multiple linear regression 
analysis of the prediction of arithmetic problems correct from TAS 
score and stress-level.
WE23 and Arithmetic Problems Correct
The analyses described above relating anxiety and stress condition 
to arithmetic problems correct were repeated using WE23 as the anxiety 
measure instead of TAS since, as noted earlier, state anxiety is a 
more sensitive indicator of situational anxiety than trait anxiety.
There was a significant contribution for WE23 above stress- 
condition. As noted previously, stress-condition by itself was not a 
























Figure 10. Mean percent of arithmetic problems answered correctly 
by trial for high-stress and low-stress conditions.
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Table 9
Results of Multiple Linear Regression 
Analysis of the Effect of Anxiety (TAS) 
on Arithmetic Problems Correct (Arbitrary Strings)
Source df F % Vara RegressionWeight
TAS 1,147 10.63* 6.7 -0.31
STRESS 1,147 2.25 1.4 0.05
TAS x STRESS 1,146 0.38 0.2 0.06





Results of Multiple Linear Regression 
Analysis of the Effect of Anxiety (WE23) 
on Arithmetic Problems Correct (Arbitrary Strings)
Source df F %Variance Regression^Weight
WE23 1,147 35.26* 19.04 -0.43
STRESS 1,147 9.90* 5.36 -5.05
WE23 x STRESS 1,146 16.34* 8.01 0.23
3Independent variance accounted for by effect
^Constant = 41.49 
*£ < .01
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knowledge of stress condition significantly improved the prediction 
of arithmetic performance over prediction from WE23 alone. The 
contribution of the WE23 x stress-condition interaction was signifi­
cant.
Figure 11 depicts the interaction between WE23 and stress- 
condition. Regardless of stress condition as anxiety (WE23) increases, 
the number of arithmetic problems answered correctly decreases.
However, the effect is stronger in the low-stress condition than in 
the high-stress condition.
Arithmetic Problems Omitted
In some cases, an arithmetic problem was not counted as correct 
because the student's answer was wrong; some answers, however, were 
omitted entirely. The number of arithmetic problems omitted (AO) was 
recorded for each subject and analyzed analagously to the other 
performance measures.
On the average, the students omitted 6.25 (s.d. * 7.66) of the 
42 problems interpolated following arbitrary strings (15%) and 1.9 
(s.d. * 2.85) of the 14 problems interpolated following the meaningful 
strings (14%) . Subjects in the high-stress condition omitted an 
average of 5.6 (s.d. * 7.13) problems on the arbitrary trials while 
subjects in the low-stress condition omitted an average of 7.1 (s.d. =■ 
8.31) on these trials. As can be seen from the standard deviations 
around the means, there was considerable variation among subjects in 
both conditions.
Figure 12 shows the number of arithmetic problems omitted by the 
low-stress and the high-stress groups on each trial. The numbers have 
been converted to percentages to simplify comparison of trials 1-4 
(6 problems each) with trials 5-8 (8 problems each).
As can be seen from Figure 12, the low-stressed subjects 
consistently omitted slightly more items than the high-stress group 









Figure 11. State anxiety by stress condition interaction for 
arithmetic problems correct.













Figure 12. Mean percent of arithmetic problems omitted by trial 
for high-stress and low-stress conditions.
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TAS and Arithmetic Problems Omitted
As with the other performance variables, the relationship between 
TAS, and stress-condition as predictors of arithmetic problems omitted 
was investigated using multiple linear regression. Table 11 summarizes 
the results of these analyses. There is considerable similarity 
between the results summarized in Table 9 (arithmetic problems correct) 
and the current analyses summarized in Table 11 (arithmetic problems 
omitted). This similarity is not surprising because problems omitted 
account for almost one-half of all errors on the interpolated task. The 
correlation between arithmetic problems correct and those omitted, on 
the arbitrary string trials, was -.87 (high-stress = -.89, low-stress * 
-.84) .
As shown in Table 11, there was a significant contribution for TAS 
independent of stress-condition. Knowledge of stress-condition did not 
significantly add to the prediction of arithmetic problems omitted, and 
as with the prediction of arithmetic problems correct, there was no 
significant interaction between stress-condition and arithmetic problems 
omitted.
WE23 and Arithmetic Problems Omitted
The analyses described above were repeated using WE23 instead of 
TAS as the measure of anxiety. The results of these analyses are 
summarized in Table 12. Both WE23 and stress-condition contributed 
significant independent variance to the prediction of problems omitted.
The stress x WE23 interaction was significant. The interaction 
is depicted in Figure 13. This figure shows that, for both groups, 
the number of problems omitted increased as state anxiety increased.
As with the other performance variables, the effect was stronger in 
the low-stress group than in the high-stress group.
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Table 11
Results of Multiple Linear Regression 
Analysis of the Effect of Anxiety (TAS) 
on Arithmetic Problems Omitted (Arbitrary Strings)
Source df F %Variancea Regression*5Weight
TAS 1,147 8.02* 5.1 0.24
STRESS 1,147 1.71 1.1 0.95
TAS x STRESS 1,146 1.45 0.9 -0.10
Independent variance accounted for by effect





Results of Multiple Linear Regression 
Analysis of the Effect of Anxiety (WE23) 
on Arithmetic Problems Omitted (Arbitrary Strings)
Source df F %Variancea Regression*3
Weight
WE23 1,147 18.48** 11.09 0.30
STRESS 1,147 5.96* 3.58 4.31
WE23 x STRESS 1,146 12.92** 7.11 -0.19
Independent
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The experiment presented in Chapter III was designed to investigate 
the hypothesis that anxiety interferes with performance on tasks which 
depend upon short-term memory processes. The results of the experiment 
are generally consistent with this hypothesis.
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part presents 
a summary of the experimental results. The second part discusses the 
findings in the context of previous and current research. Finally, the 
implications of the findings for educational practice and future 
research are considered.
Summary of Results
The results of the experiment are summarized in the following
sections. The first section discusses the fluctuation in state anxiety
arousal as a result of experimental stress. The second section describes 
the relationship between state anxiety and performance. The third
section discusses the relationship between anxiety and performance.
State Anxiety Arousal
Students participating in the experiment were subject to stress 
from two sources: the experimental manipulation and the experimental
task. Students in the high-stress condition were exposed to both 
sources of stress while students in the low-stress condition were 
stressed only by the experimental task. Levels of perceived stress 
were assessed by asking the students to complete the state worry/emotion- 
ality scale at four points during the experiment. The state anxiety of 
the high-stress group was expected to rise as a result of their exposure 
to the stress induction procedure while the state anxiety of the low- 
stress group was expected to remain unaffected by the initial instructions 
and task.
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As hypothesized, state anxiety scores increased for the high-stress 
group following stress induction but not for the low-stress group following 
the neutral task.
State anxiety was measured for the third time half-way through 
the experimental task. The state anxiety of the low-stress group 
increased following exposure to the experimental task. The anxiety 
scores of the high-stress group did not further increase, although 
their anxiety was maintained at its previous stress level.
The Effect of State Anxiety on Performance
State anxiety had a disruptive effect on performance on both the 
recall task and the interpolated task. Inspection of the means revealed 
that high anxiety was associated with lower recall and fewer problems 
correct on the interpolated task. Although the direction of the 
relationship between anxiety and performance was in the predicted 
direction in all cases, the relationship was significant only in the 
low-stress group. This was an unexpected finding since it had been 
predicted that the relationship would be strongest under conditions of 
evaluative stress. Overall, subjects in the high-stress condition did 
not perform as well as those in the low-stress condition. But within 
condition, the relationship between reported state anxiety and performance 
was significant only for the low-stress group.
The Relationship Between Trait Anxiety and Performance
High trait anxiety, as measured by the TAS, was associated with 
lower performance on both the recall task and the interpolated task. 
However, the relationship was significant only for the interpolated 
task. Knowledge of the students' stress condition did not add to the 
prediction of performance.
In summary, the findings support the hypotheses that anxiety 
disrupts short-term memory performance. However, contrary to expect­
ations, the effect was strongest in the low-stress condition.
Theoretical Significance 
The findings summarized above are consistent with the hypothesis 
that anxiety interferes with short-term memory processing. Students 
in the high-stress group reported higher levels of state anxiety than 
those in the low-stress group and recalled fewer letters than the low- 
stress group. High state anxiety scores were associated with reduced
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recall but this relationship was significant only for the low-stress 
group.
The inverse relationship between anxiety and recall is consistent 
with Posner and Rossman's (1965) characterization of short-term memory 
as an active process which is subject to attentional interference.
These results are in accord with the experimental findings of Sieber, 
Kameya, and Paulson (1970).
The inverse relationship between anxiety and recall was observed 
for the trait anxiety measure but did not reach significance. This 
result is not surprising as the TAS is not a measure of aroused anxiety 
but is a measure of an individual's tendency to experience anxiety 
reactions in a test-like environment. A high score on the TAS does 
not predict the extent (or even the occurrence) of an anxiety reaction 
in a particular situation. Although, a group of high-scoring individuals 
on the TAS would tend to experience more anxiety than a group of low TAS 
scores in a given test-like situation, TAS score reveals little about 
the individual reactions to stress.
Because of this limitation, the TAS is a less useful tool for the 
study of experimentally-aroused anxiety than it is for selecting 
individuals who are prone to experience anxiety reactions. The failure 
of the relationship to reach significance is most probably due to the 
imprecise relationship between the TAS score and the aroused anxiety.
This hypothesis is consistent with findings reported by Hodges 
and Spielberger (1969) who found that state anxiety (as measured by 
the Zuckerman Adjective Check List) was related to short-term memory 
performance as measured by the Digit Span subtest of the Wechsler 
Intelligence scale. However, trait anxiety (as measured by the Taylor 
MAS) was not found to be related to Digit Span performance.
The finding that anxiety impaired task performance, generally, is 
in accord with previous research and the consistent finding that arousal 
impairs performance on tasks that are not serially repetetive and over­
learned. (Broverman, Klaiber, Vogel, and Kobayashi, 1974).
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One hypothesis often cited to explain the relationship between 
anxiety and task performance is that the arousal component of anxiety 
functions as a drive to increase response competition (Spence, 1964).
This hypothesis has considerable empirical support and appears to be a 
determinant in the individual's response to anxiety.
A second hypothesis suggests that the occurrence of an anxiety 
reaction serves as a cue to elicit task-irrelevant responses. (Mandler 
and S. Sarason, 1952.) Because these responses are attentionally 
demanding (I. Sarason, 1960; Wine, 1971; I. Sarason, 1972), they disrupt 
the highly focalized attention needed to facilitate task performance.
These two hypotheses are not contradictory if the task-irrelevant 
responses are viewed as competing with task-facilitating responses. 
According to this view, anxiety, by increasing response competition, 
would tend to increase the probability of task-irrelevant responses 
to task cues.
In the current study, membership in the high-stress group was 
associated with impaired performance on the recall task but not on 
the interpolated task. If response competition were the only factor 
affecting performance, it would be expected that the arithmetic task 
would be the most impaired since it was more complex than the recall 
task.
As previously noted, performance on the meaningful strings was 
essentially error-free for most individuals. In the few cases in which 
an error occurred, the individual omitted the entire string. Because 
there were no significant differences between the high low-stress groups 
on the meaningful strings, the lower recall of the high-stress group 
cannot be attributed to their having failed to attend to the initial 
presentation of the to-be-recalled strings. In terms of Tobias' (1977) 
information-processing model, the lack of a significant relationship 
between anxiety and performance on the meaningful strings reinforces the 
notion that the disruption took place during processing rather than during 
input.
This finding thus supports the hypothesis of rehearsal interference 
due to attentional alternation. In information processing terms, the 
attentional alternation resulting from anxiety, acted like an interpolated
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task which, in conjunction with the arithmetic task, exceeded the rehearsal 
capacity of the stressed individuals. A similar hypothesis was advanced by 
Sieber, Kameya, and Paulson (1970).
Although stress condition did not affect arithmetic performance, 
trait anxiety predicted performance on this task for both the high- 
stress and the low-stress groups. Since over 75% of the variance in 
arithmetic performance was accounted for by problems omitted, it appears 
that TAS may be largely measuring a motivational aspect of task 
performance. This notion is in accord with Atkinson's (1964) construct 
of fear of failure which is often considered identical to "trait test 
anxiety."
One of the most interesting results of the study was the unexpected 
finding that the relationship between WE score and performance was 
significant only in the low-stress condition.
A possible explanation of this finding is that individuals in the 
high-stress condition were less accurate in their self-reports of 
aroused anxiety than individuals in the low-stress group. This explana­
tion is consistent with research that suggests that high levels of 
arousal tend to impair fine discriminations (Easterbrook, 1959). The 
unpleasantness of anxiety reactions makes it unlikely that the anxious 
individual will be disposed to carefully evaluate them.
The relationship between reported anxiety and performance may be 
described by five parameters: the means (^^23’ ^TASK^ * C^e variances
( s^g, stask and the correlation between them (rWE TASR)• In the
2high stress condition, was greater than in the low-stress condition
but rTTr. T,c» was lower. This suggests that the increased variance inWfc ,1 AoK.
the WE score may have been due to error component. Inspection of the 
regression lines relating WE score to task performance (Figures 9, 11 
and 13) reveals that, although regression lines for both high and low- 
stress have negative slope, the slope of the high-stress line appears 
to be attenuated and tending toward the mean. This pattern is consistent 
with the hypothesis of increased error in the high-stress condition.
In summary, the data appear consistent with the hypothesis that 
anxiety interferes with short-term memory rehearsal. State anxiety is 
a more useful predictor of performance than trait anxiety although trait
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anxiety may be a useful measure of motivation. It is possible that 
individuals who are stressed by ego-involving task instructions are 
less accurate than unstressed individuals in their self-report 
measures of anxiety.
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Implications for Education and Future Research
Although the results of a single study cannot be considered 
conclusive, the study suggests a number of implications for educational 
practice and future research.
To the extent that test anxiety affects problem-solving behavior, 
it confounds the measurement of academic achievement. It is difficult 
to assess the magnitude of the effects which anxiety has upon learning 
because the available measures of anxiety are insufficiently precise 
to permit their estimation. It is probable that the disruptive effects 
of anxiety on school performance are considerable.
Anxiety is often considered to be an educational problem only when 
its manifestations are so dramatic that a student's maladaptive behavior 
comes to the attention of the teacher. A child who exhibits anxiety 
symptoms such as school-related phobias, may be referred to the school 
psychologist. But, the child who is inattentive, sloppy, or timid may 
equally be the victim of anxiety which results in sub-optimal school 
performance. Most individuals are test-anxious to some degree. The 
extent to which moderate amounts of anxiety reduce their ability to achieve 
needs to be investigated.
In particular, the relationship of anxiety to socio-economic
status and academic achievement needs to be elaborated. It is a matter 
of current national concern that children from families of low socio­
economic status appear to be at an educational disadvantage as compared 
to those whose families are economically more successful. Because 
education is so essential in our increasingly technological society, 
students who are not academically successful may find themselves unable 
to achieve financial success. The uncertainty and lack of environ­
mental stability which accompanies poverty, the fact that academic 
success is often not reinforced by parental approval, and the belief 
that schools are agencies of the social system which the family has 
failed to master, suggest the hypothesis that the school performance of 
a large segment of the population is anxiety-impaired. Research is
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needed to determine what aspects of the school environment are anxiety- 
evoking and how anxiety affects cognitive performance.
The current study addressed the issue of the relationship between 
anxiety and cognition. Further work is needed to extend the current 
findings. Because anxiety, attention, and short-term memory are all 
covert constructs, many studies will be needed to confirm inferences 
about their interrelationship. Aspects which need to be further invest­
igated include: the relationship between response competition and
attentional alternation, and the relationship between task characteristics 
and short-term memory requirements.
Both the current study and the recent study by Deffenbacher 
(1978) support the hypothesis of attentional alternation. Further 
research is needed to confirm and extend these results.
Broadbent and Heron (1962) have shown that short-term memory 
performance varies as a function of the rehearsal contention between 
two tasks. The rehearsal demands of the prompted-recall task employed 
in the current study could be varied by using to-be-recalled strings 
of different lengths. As string length increased, the effect of 
anxiety on retention would be expected to increase since the longer 
strings would require more rehearsal than shorter strings. Kahneman 
(1973) has noted that physiological arousal increases as task difficulty 
increases. Accordingly, it is possible that individuals who are asked 
to recall longer strings will experience higher levels of emotionality 
than those asked to recall shorter strings.
Deffenbacher (1978) employed a retrospective measure of attentional 
alternation. It would be desirable to obtain measures of attentional 
alternation concurrently with task performance. This might be 
accomplished in conjunction with a computer-assisted instructional 
task. By requesting that individuals indicate fluctuations in attention 
by pressing a special key, it would be possible to obtain a measure of 
distraction which is concurrent with task performance. The sensitivity 
of such a procedure would depend upon the individual's ability to detect 
periods of distraction. Previous work by Wine (1970) suggests that 
individuals can learn to recognize such periods.
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More sophisticated measures of attention might be developed by 
tracking an individual's eye movements during task performance. Such 
measures might be useful for detecting very short periods of task- 
irrelevant attentional focus and would not depend on the individual's 
self-awareness.
The relationship between worry and emotionality needs to be 
further studied. Morris and Fulmer (1976) have suggested that emotion­
ality responses may be classically-conditioned autonomic responses to 
cues in the test situation. Drive theory (Spence, 1958) and Spielberger's 
(1966) state-trait model predict that autonomic responses could serve 
as cues to maintain the anxiety reaction. A common approach to anxiety 
reduction is to condition relaxation responses antagonistic to anxiety 
arousal. Attentional theory would predict a reduction of task- 
irrelevant attentional focus as a result of such training due to the 
reduction in the autonomic cues.
If anxiety disrupts short-term memory processing, it may be 
possible to mitigate its effects by providing memory support to anxious 
students. This approach has been tried with some success by Sieber, 
Kameya, and Paulson (1970). An alternative approach to reducing the 
disruptive effects of anxiety would be to train anxious students to 
maintain focal attention on the relevant task; this approach has been 
investigated by Wine (1970), I. Sarason (1975), and I. Sarason and 
Stoops (1978).
A common classroom situation in which recall may be impaired has 
been termed the "next-in-line" effect (Walker and Orr, 1976). While 
waiting to be called upon, some students appear to focus on anxiety- 
related thoughts and fail to adequately process previous students' 
responses. Attentional training may help reduce this effect.
The confounding effects of anxiety in achievement testing can be 
minimized by reducing the stress-arousing cues in the environment, 
emphasizing power tests over speeded tests, and providing memory 
support where appropriate. The effects of anxiety on test scores 
probably varies with the nature of the assessment task; research into 
task characteristics most vulnerable to interference is needed (Morris 
and Fulmer, 1976).
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The effect of anxiety on cognition involves processes in addition 
to short-term memory. Studies have shown anxiety to affect retrieval 
from long-term memory, creativity, and styles of concept formation. 
Anxiety impairs students’ ability to accurately estimate time intervals 
(I. Sarason and Stoops, 1978). The relationships between anxiety and 
school learning need to be further explicated.
Finally, there is need for new developments in the measurement 
of anxiety. The limitations of self-report questionnaires are well- 
known and such instruments fail to adequately capture the idiosyncratic, 
multidimensional nature of the construct (Kendall, 1978). Observational 
data may prove a fruitful measurement technique —  particularly with 
respect to content analysis of self-description (Post, Wittmaier, and 
Radin, 1978; I. Sarason, 1960). To the extent that attentional focus 
can be observed, such measures may be useful in assessing the level 
of aroused anxiety.
Our understanding of the impact of anxiety on all aspects of human 
behavior is one of the most important insights to emerge from this 
century. The nature of that understanding has been increasingly 
elaborated by researchers and clinicians. The task is far from over 
but progress has been encouraging. And, the reward for understanding 
and controlling anxiety may well be the beginning of the evolution of a 
humanistic social structure in which freedom from fear and guilt permits 





In order to verify the effectiveness of the experimental design 
and to determine values for critical task parameters, a number of 
preliminary studies were conducted. The major goals of these studies 
were:
1. To assess the effectiveness of the stress instructions 
in evoking anxiety,
2. To determine the appropriate length of the to-be-remembered 
string,
3. To design an interpolated task which would be sufficiently 
complex to limit subjects' rehearsal while simple enough 
to permit retention of the string under non-stress 
conditions.
Pilot Study 1 - The Effect of Varying Exposure
The first of informal study was carried out in order to determine 
if the duration of initial exposure to the to-be-remembered string 
affected retention. Exposure time to six letter consonant strings were 
varied from 0.5 to 5.0 seconds. Three subjects were asked to recall 
the strings after working for 45 seconds on an interpolated task which 
consisted of crossing out all occurrences of the letter "A" on a page 
of random letters. All subjects were able to accurately recall the 
strings, regardless of initial exposure time. Subjects reported that 
the interpolated task did not interfere with their ability to rehearse 
the string. As a result of this informal study, it was concluded that 
duration of exposure was a less critical variable than the difficulty 
of the interpolated task. Studies using the short-term memory distractor 
paradigm often employ an arithmetic interpolated task (Watkins, 1967).
In order to facilitate the design of an appropriate interpolated 
task, several variants on the first informal studv were performed. Each
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variant tested the recall of three subjects on a to-be-remembered to- 
be-remembered string of six consonants. String exposures of 1.0, 1.5,
2.0, 3.0, and 5.0 seconds were tested using different interpolated 
tasks. Results indicated that interpolated tasks involving the addition 
or multiplication of two one-digit numbers were too oimple to interfere 
with the retention of the string. More complex multiplications proved 
too difficult for some subjects. The task which emerged as most 
appropriate, was the mental addition of four summands such as: 4 + 8 +
11 + 6 = ? Requiring the subjects to perform a series of these summations 
following exposure to a to-be-remembered string resulted in somewhat less 
than perfect retention during the relaxed and relatively informal studies. 
It was felt, therefore, that this task would create sufficient rehearsal 
interference to accentuate the effect of stress on short-term retention.
A pilot study 2 was conducted in order to determine the effectiveness of 
this task in a more rigorous experimental environment.
Pilot Study 2 - The Interpolated Task
Method and Procedure. The subjects were 23 students at a public 
university enrolled in two class sections of an Educational Psychology 
course. Twelve of the subjects were males while eleven of the subjects 
were female. The first class section was treated as a low-stress 
group (N=15) while the second section was treated as a high-stress 
group (N=8).
Stimulus materials were typed on 35mm sprocketed acetate film using 
an IBM Selectric typewriter with a nvlon film ribbon. Slides containing 
a large question mark (?) were produced using rub-on transfer letters 
and were mounted by the same technique as the typed slides.
The subjects were given response booklets in which they recorded 
their answers. The booklets were identical for both groups except for 
the cover; the cover for the low-stress group had the word "experiment" 
typed on it while the high-stress group received protocols which 
indicated that the booklet was an experimental edition of the "Wolenheim 
Intelligence Test". Serial numbers and copyright notices were printed 
on the stress booklets to give the impression of a professionally 
produced test.
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The slide projector and screen were in place when the students 
arrived. In the low-stress condition, the students were asked to 
participate in an "educational experiment" to help the experimenter 
with his dissertation research. A similar setting was used for the 
high-stress condition but the students were asked to serve as an 
experimental group in the development of a new intelligence test.
The following instructions were read to the non stress group:
As part of my psychology course, I am conducting a 
study about memory in which I would appreciate your 
help. Before I explain about the study, I will ask 
you to fill out a short questionnaire describing how 
you feel right now. I need this information for the 
study.
The corresponding instructions for the stress group were:
We are doing some research in testing and would
like your help in evaluating some new ideas.
Before I explain exactly what we are doing, I 
will ask you to fill out a brief questionnaire 
on which you can describe how you are feeling 
right now. It is important that you accurately 
state your feelings so we know how this type of 
experience is interpreted by students.
The State Worry-Emotionality scale was then handed out. Students 
were also asked to rate their expectancy of success on a scale of 1 to 10. 
Following administration of the W-E scale, the following instructions
were read to the non-stress group:
As I told you, the study involves memory. The 
first task I will ask you to do is relatively 
s imp le.
While corresponding instructions were read to the high-stress group:
Now I'll explain the purpose of this study.
In the past, many psychologists have measured 
intelligence by using 1.0. tests, which measure
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what you know. The purpose of this study 
is to measure intelligence by how well you can 
perform on some memory and arithmetic tasks.
The reason that we are using these tasks is 
simple; earlier research has shown that people 
who are able to do well on this type of task
are brighter than those who do poorly. So we
expect that your performance on these tasks will 
be an indication of your intelligence. The first 
task you are to attempt is relatively simple.
This was followed by instructions for the stress-induction (failure) 
or control task.
Although the instructions and sample slides administered to the 
two groups were the same, the task itself was not. Subjects in the 
low-stress condition were asked to recall four character consonant 
strings such as "PZNF"; the task proved to be a simple one. Subjects 
in the stress group were asked to recall ten character consonant
strings such as "MLRWCXTVJO". As these strings exceeded the capacity
of the subjects' short term memory the task proved impossible to perform 
successfully. Following completion of the stress induction task, 
subjects were asked to complete out the State W-E scale.
The short-term memory task was then administered. The task 
consisted of eight to-be-recalled strings. The string was exposed for 
1.5 seconds. Then a series of arithmetic computations were presented 
(interpolated task). A slide with a question mark (?) on it served as 
the cue for the subject to write down the to-be-recalled string. As 
shown in table A-l, the length of string, meaningfulness of string, 
and number of interpolated problems was varied across trials.
Following administration of the experimental task, the subjects 
were given 15 minutes to complete a questionnaire in which they 
described their feelings regarding the experiment. The test booklets 
were collected and the remainder of the class period was devoted to 
debriefing the students in order to remove any residual stress.
115
Table A-l
Stimulus Sequences for Pilot Study 1
Sequence 1: CLHRDWF
1 3 + 9 + 7 + 8 *
Sequence 2: CPWKTS
6 + 13 + 9 + 8
1 1 + 5 + 9 + 4 = 12 + 4 + 6 + 3 *
7 + 6 + 12 + 9 - 9 + 8 + 16 + 6 ae
1 3 + 3 + 4 + 6 - 4 + 10 + 6 + 4 33
6 + 13 + 4 + 9 - 4 + 2 + 11 + 3 »
4 + 8 + 12 + 4 - 2 + 11 + 6 + 2 *
? 5 + 9 + 14 + 6
Sequence 3: PLANET Sequence 4: JTNVS
Sequence 5:
Sequence 7:
7 + 2 + 1 + 12 2 + 13 + 8 + 7
1 2 + 5 + 6 + 4 11 + 8 + 6 + 7
9 + 7 + 14 + 5 8 + 9 + 16 + 4
4 + 12 + 5 + 1 11 + 3 + 7 + 2
7 + 12 + 5 + 8 13 + 2 + 5 + 9
4 + 9 + 18 + 5 10 + 1 + 3 + 6
? 7 + 8 +
7
11 + 5
GOBPAV Sequence 6: LDMQNZ
1 1 + 3 + 2 + 4 14 + 5 + 8 + 6
1 1 + 7 + 4 + 8 6 + 11 + 7 + 1
9 + 6 + 18 + 5 9 + 5 + 11 + 6
7 + 11 + 9 + 6 12 + 5 + 6 + 4
5 + 11 + 7 + 4 11 + 3 + 4 + 6
1 1 + 5 + 8 + 6 7 + 9 + 16 + 6
6 + 8 +
7
17 + 5 7
DRIVES Sequence 8: HRFBJV
8 + 11 + 2 + 1 12 + 6 + 7 + 5
1 3 + 4 + 6 + 5 5 + 12 + 6 + 3
9 + 6 + 8 + 17 4 + 8 + 11 + 3
4 + 11 + 6 + 2 13 + 2 + 6 + 3
1 1 + 3 + 5 + 4 5 + 13 + 4 + 3
1 4 + 6 + 7 + 4 6 + 13 + 3 + 7
5 + 7 + 14 + 9 5 + 8 + 11 + 4
? ?
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Results. The effectiveness of the stress induction was assessed 
by computing the mean state anxiety scores before and after the stress 
induction (or control) task. For the high-stress group, state anxiety 
increased significantly (Xpre = 17.25, Xpost = 19.63, t(7) = -2.48, 
p <.025). For the low-stress group, anxiety did not increase following 
the control task (Xpre = 13.00, Xpost = 13.74, t(14) * -0.76, n.s.). 
Statistically controlling for the differences in pre-induction anxiety, 
analysis of covariance revealed that the high and low-stress groups 
differed significantly on post-induction anxiety (F(l,20) * 11.16, 
p < .003).
Table A-2 summarizes the performance of the high and low-stress 
groups in terms of letters correctly recalled. As can be seen from 
this table, the high-stress group generally recalled fewer strings 
than the low-stress group.
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Table A-2 
Letters Recalled Correctly 






X % a t O*
1 7 4.62 66 .92 5.47 78 1.06 -1.90 .035
2 6 3.38 56 1.92 4.40 73 1.60 -1.37 .09
4 5 4.50 90 .76 4.60 92 .74 -0.31 n.s.
5 6 5.62 93 .74 5.93 98 .26 -1.47 .075
6 6 3.86 64 2.64 4.00 66 1.60 -0.14 n.s.
8 6 3.86 64 1.89 3.87 64 1.89 .01 n.s.
* probabilities reported are for rejection of a one-tailed hypothesis
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Pilot Study 3 - The Optimal String Length
In order to obtain further information regarding optimal string 
length, a third pilot study was conducted.
Method and Procedure. Subjects in the second pilot study were 27 
students (14 of whom were male) enrolled in an undergraduate educational 
psychology course at Trenton State College. Their ages ranged from 19 
to 30 years. Because the purpose of the second study was to determine 
performance under optimum conditions, a stress induction procedure was 
not used.
The materials employed were similar to those used in pilot study 
one. Two strings of length six, two strings of length seven, and two 
of length eight were employed. All strings were arbitrary (non-mean- 
ingful). Because the intent was to assess different string lengths, 
the number of interpolated computation problems was kept constant 
(there were eight). Table A-3 contains the stimulus sequences for 
pilot study three.
The procedure used was the same as that used for the low-stress 
group in pilot study two, except that the state W-E scales and the 
neutral tasks were not administered.
Results. The results of pilot study two are presented in Table 
A-4. Inspection of string length did not appear to be a critical 
variable since the mean number of letters recalled in all cases except 
trial 6 was between two and four.
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Table A-3




KGPYMB Sequence 4: GCPJLV
6 + 1 3 + 9 + 8 = 14 + 5 + 8 + 6
12 + 4 + 6 + 3 = 6 + 1 1 + 7 + 1
9 + 8 + 1 6 + 6 = 9 + 5 + 1 1 + 6
4 +10 + 6 + 4 = 1 2 + 5 + 6 + 4
4 + 2 + 1 1 + 3 = 1 1 + 3 + 4 + 6
2 +11 + 6 + 2 = 7 + 9 + 1 6 + 6
5 + 9 + 14 + 6 = 1 2 + 7 + 6 + 3
7 + 2 + 1 + 1 2 = 1 1 + 3 + 7
7
+ 2
CLZRDWF Sequence 5: RQFMZWTJ
13 + 9 + 7 + 8 = 8 + 1 1 + 2 + 1
11 + 5 + 9 + 4 = 1 3 + 4 + 6 + 5
7 + 6 +12 + 9 = 9 + 6 + 8 +17
1 3 + 3 + 4 + 6 = 4 + 1 1 + 6 + 2
6 +13 + 4 + 9 = 1 1 + 3 + 5 + 4
5 + 8 +12 + 4 = 1 4 + 6 + 7 + 4
1 0 + 1 + 3 + 6 = 5 + 7 + 1 4 + 9
7 + 8 +11 + 5 = 7 + 1 2 + 5
7
+ 8
VJNQSHKB Sequence 6: KDYHBSN
6 + 8 +17 + 5 = 1 2 + 6 + 7 + 5
5 +11 + 7 + 4 = 5 + 1 2 + 6 + 3
9 + 6  +18 + 5 = 4 + 8 + 1 1 + 3
7 +11 + 9 + 6 = 1 3 + 2 + 6 + 3
11 + 3 + 2 + 4 = 5 + 1 3 + 4 + 3
11 + 7 + 4 + 8 = 6 + 1 3 + 3 + 7
4 +12 + 5 + 1 = 5 + 8 + 1 1 + 4
1 1 + 5 + 8 + 6 =
9




Mean Recall as a Function of String Length
Trial 1 2 3 4 5 6
Length 6 7 8 6 8 7
Mean
Recall 3.96 2.48 3.18 3.22 3.66 5.00
Percent





Print Your Name Here
(LAST)
Circle Your Sex: MALE FEMALE 







Do not break the seal until you are told to do so.
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DIRECTIONS: C ircle the 1 if  the statement does not describe your present feelings 
C ircle the 2 if  the feeling is barely noticeable
C ircle the 3 if  the feeling is moderately strong
C ircle the 4 if  the feeling is  strong
C ircle the 5 if  the feeling is very strong
I  do not feel very confident about my performance
on this experim ent.............................    1 2 3 4 5
I  feel my heart beating fa s t.....................................................  1 2 3 4 5
I  find myself thinking of how much brighter
the other students are than I a m ...........................................  1 2 3 4 5
I  am so nervous that I  may forget facts which
I  really know..............................................................................  1 2 3 4 5
I  am worry ing a great deal about this experiment . . .  1 2 3 4 5
I  am so tense that my stomach is upset................................. 1 2 3 4 5
Considering my state of mind, I  feel I  could have
prepared myself better fo r this e x p e rim e n t....................... 1 2 3 4 5
I  feel very panicky about participating in this experiment . 1 2 3 4 5
I am thinking of the consequences of performing poorly. . 1 2 3 4 5
I  have an uneasy upset feeling..................................................  1 2 3 4 5
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DIRECTIONS: C ircle the number which Indicates how w ell
you think you w ill perform  on this experiment.
0 1  2 3  4 5 6  7 8 9  10A A
definitely definitely w ill
w ill not do do as well as
as w ell as I  I  would like
would like
Appendix C 
Analysis of Performance Using Worry 
and Emotionality Scores Separately
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The analyses presented in Chapter IV were based on combined 
worry and emotionality scores. The scores were combined because 
they were highly correlated and because emotionality has been shown 
to exhibit patterns of variation similar to worry (Deffenbacher,
1978). From a theoretical perspective, however, worry would appear 
to be the more powerful of the two factors in its affect on 
attentional focus (Morris and Fulmer, 1977; Wine, 1971). Accordingly, 
the analyses reported in Chapter IV were also performed using the 
worry and emotionality scores separately. These analyses are 
summarized in Table C.l. As can be seen in the table the differences 
were not significant.
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T a b l e  c . i
Multiple Correl irion for Regression ‘''dels Predicting Task Performance from 





Regression Model'1 UK 2 3 W2 3 723
LC123567 Y = A .236 .227 . 323
(letters correct)
Y = A + S .269 .251 . 2 54
Y = A + S + (A :< S) .328 . 29 3 .344
AC123567 <n .386 .367 .370
(problems correc t)
Y - A + S .4 30 .4 33 ix ? "*
Y =* A + S + (A x S) .531 .501 .517
A0123567 n . 291 . 272 .233
(problems omitted)
Y = A + S .34 7 .334 .3 30
Y = A + S + (A x S) .438 .394 .4-W
aA : anxiety measure (WE23, W23, E23)
S: stress condition (high, low)
b-weight coefficients are not shown
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